IFS – The NEN – North Edinburgh News

320,000 people pushed into poverty because of mortgage interest rate rises

“Poverty statistics that hide the real scale of increases risk policymakers missing what is truly happening to poverty.”

Many households remortgaging or taking out new mortgages since 2022 have experienced sharp falls in their disposable income as higher interest rates have pushed up housing costs, and by December 2023 this is set to have pushed 320,000 such people into poverty. But official data do not measure mortgage interest payments properly, so official poverty statistics will only capture about two-thirds of this effect (230,000 people).

These are the findings of a new IFS report, released on Thursday and funded by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, which examines recent trends in poverty and deprivation. Other key findings include:

Despite the pandemic and the cost-of-living crisis, the overall rate of absolute poverty was the same in 2022–23 as in 2019–20 (18%, or 12.0 million people), though it did rise slightly by 0.8 percentage points (520,000) between 2021–22 and 2022–23. But there was a significant increase in more direct measures of hardship. For example, the proportion of working-age adults who reported being unable to keep their home warm enough rose from 4% to 11% (1.8 million to 4.6 million) between 2019–20 and 2022–23, and the share who reported being behind on bills rose from 5% to 6% (2.1 million to 2.5 million).
Part of the difference is likely to relate to how the official statistics measure incomes and hence poverty. Higher energy and food prices mean that lower-income households and pensioners faced a higher inflation rate than average – but this is not captured by the official poverty statistics. Taking account of higher inflation for these households implies poverty rose by 210,000 more people than implied by official statistics for 2021–22 and 2022–23 (730,000 people rather than 520,000), including 80,000 pensioners.
In addition, the official statistics do not measure households’ mortgage interest payments directly, instead modelling them based on average interest rates. This matters when there is a growing spread of interest rates as some households come off their fixed rate: in 2022–23, mismeasurement of mortgage interest payments resulted in the number in poverty being understated by 70,000; as more fixed-term mortgages end, that number is set to rise to 150,000 (based on December 2023 interest rates).
There is evidence that mortgage rate rises have pushed some adults into financial hardship. Adults remortgaging in 2022 were 2 percentage points more likely to fall into arrears on bills than those with mortgages who had not remortgaged. This suggests that, once all households have remortgaged, the number of adults behind on bills could rise by 370,000.

Sam Ray-Chaudhuri, a Research Economist at IFS and an author of the report, said: ‘Rising mortgage rates have played and are likely to continue to play an important role in many households’ living standards. But, perhaps surprisingly, they are not measured properly in the official income data.

“This has led to the headline statistics understating the number of people in poverty, something set to get worse in next year’s data. Poverty rises have also been understated due to the unequal impact of inflation.

“At a time when rates of deprivation and food insecurity have risen substantially, poverty statistics that hide the real scale of these increases risk policymakers missing what is truly happening to poverty.’

Peter Matejic, JRF Chief Analyst, said: ‘This research shows the cost-of-living crisis wasn’t felt equally by everyone. Compared with before the COVID pandemic, many more people, especially those on a lower income, struggled to heat their homes or keep up with their bills.

‘One reason lower-income households went without essentials is because they faced a rate of inflation even higher than the headline numbers. High interest rates also saw many households forced into financial hardship after they remortgaged.

‘This report raises many questions about whether social security is adequate for the challenges looming over struggling households. The new government can’t wait for growth, after years of cuts, caps and freezes to social security have left families without the financial resilience and security they needed to cope with higher prices and costs.’

Commenting on the IFS report IFS on poverty, which shows that 320,000 people pushed into poverty because of mortgage interest rate rises, TUC General Secretary Paul Nowak said: “This surge in poverty shows the awful impact on people’s lives of the Conservatives’ economic and policy failures.

“It’s a poverty crisis that has been created by poor growth and social security cuts. Interest rate hikes came on top of the longest period of pay stagnation for more than 200 years.

“Rapid delivery of the government’s plan to make work pay will ensure more better-paid, secure jobs and help reduce poverty among working families.”

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Without reform, the two-child limit will affect an additional 670,000 children by the end of next parliament

What impact has the ‘two-child limit’ in universal credit had, and what policy choices does the next government face? – a report by Institute for Fiscal Studies

Low-income families typically receive an additional £3,455 a year of universal credit (or child tax credit) for each child they have¹ . But the ‘two-child limit’ means that claimants do not receive an additional amount for third or subsequent children born after 5 April 2017.

This policy has been the subject of controversy, and the Liberal Democrats and Green Party have both committed to abolishing the limit in their manifestos, while the Labour Party have said they will abolish it ‘when fiscal conditions allow’.

In this comment, we (IFS) outline the impact of the two-child limit on household incomes and work incentives, and the public finances.

To illustrate the impact of the policy, take a lone parent with three children who lives in social rented accommodation costing £500 per month² , and not working.

Their universal credit entitlement will be made up of the basic £4,721 per year in universal credit for single adults; £6,000 to cover the cost of their housing; and – in the absence of the two-child limit – £10,365 for their children³ .

On top of this, they receive £3,102 a year in child benefit, which is unaffected by the two-child limit, giving them a total income of £24,188 (without the two-child limit); they would also generally have support to cover most or all of their council tax bill. The two-child limit means they receive £3,455 less each year in universal credit, representing a 14% cut to their income and putting them into relative poverty.

Turning to the impact across the population, we find that, when fully rolled out, on average affected households will lose £4,300 per year, representing 10% of their average income and 22% of average benefit income⁴ .

These losses are concentrated among 790,000 households (10% of working-age households with children) and would affect nearly one in five children (2.8 million).

As things stand, the policy affects only 550,000 households. The difference is because there are families with three children all of whom were born before 6 April 2017; as time passes, more and more large families will have children born after that date.

We estimate that 250,000 extra children will be affected by the policy next year and 670,000 extra children will be affected by the end of the next parliament. HMRC statistics show that in 2023, 50% of families affected by the two-child limit were single parents and 57% had at least one adult in paid work.

Figure 1 shows where in the household income distribution households that are affected by the two-child limit sit. For comparison, we also show the equivalent for all households with children and all households with children receiving universal credit.

Unsurprisingly, the two-child limit disproportionately affects poorer households, but the figure shows that affected households are also more likely to have low income than are all universal-credit-receiving families with children.

76% of households affected by the two-child limit are in the poorest 30% of working-age households. In comparison, 63% of households eligible for universal credit with children are in the poorest 30% of working-age households.

Figure 1. Distribution of households affected by two-child limit; universal credit claimants with children; and all households with children, by equivalised income decile

_{Note: Assumes full take-up of benefits and full roll-out of universal credit and the two-child limit. Only includes households where all adults are under 66.}

_{Source: Authors’ calculations using the Family Resources Survey 2022–23 and TAXBEN, the IFS tax and benefit microsimulation model.}

The two-child limit has an (even more) outsized impact on children living in low-income households, as, by definition, a household affected by the two-child limit has at least three children. It affects 23% of households with children in the poorest fifth of the income distribution, but 38% of children in the poorest fifth of the income distribution.

The two-child limit also has varied impacts across families of different ethnicities. We estimate that 43% of children in households with one adult of Bangladeshi or Pakistani origin (400,000 children) would be affected by the policy when fully rolled out, compared with 17% of children in other households (2.4 million children). This reflects both these families having more children and them being more likely to be on low income.

The two-child limit would be even more targeted at the poorest households if it was not for a separate policy: the benefit cap. The benefit cap limits the total amount that a family with no adults in work can claim to £22,020 a year outside London and £25,323 a year inside London (lower amounts are applied for single adults without children). 110,000 households are not directly affected by the two-child limit as the benefit cap already limits their entitlements. Almost all these households are in the poorest fifth of households.

Figure 2 shows relative child poverty rates, defined as being in a household with an income (after housing costs) below 60% of median income, split by the number of children in the household.

Since 2014–15, relative poverty rates have declined for families with one or two children, but they have increased for families with three or more children⁵ .

Absolute poverty rates have also diverged: they have fallen for small families but remained unchanged for large families. So, in absolute terms, low-income large families are about as well off as they were in 2015, but their incomes have fallen further behind relative to other households, including small families.

Figure 2. Relative child poverty rates after housing costs, 2008–09 to 2022–23

_{Note: The fall in poverty rates in 2020–21 is at least partly due to benefit expansions in that year, including raising maximum housing support and a temporary £20 per week uplift to universal credit.}

_{Source: Authors’ calculations using}_{Family Resources Survey}_{, 2008–09 to 2022–23.}

The two-child limit is likely one driver of this recent increase in relative child poverty rates for larger families. However, it is not the only explanation. Other benefit cuts are likely to affect larger families more as they on average receive more of their income from benefits (the benefit cap also disproportionately affects larger families); and broader economic trends may also play a role.

Nevertheless, removing the two-child limit would certainly go some way to reversing the recent increase in poverty rates for large families. We estimate that removing the two-child limit would reduce relative child poverty by approximately 500,000 (4% of all children)⁶ .

The two-child limit has a relatively small effect on work incentives. One statistic that helps explain work incentives is replacement rates: the household’s income if an individual was out of work as a percentage of their in-work household income. The lower someone’s replacement rate, the more incentive they have to remain in work.

With the two-child limit, an average working parent with three or more children has a replacement rate of 62.1%; without it, they would have a slightly higher replacement rate of 63.0%.

This average difference is small for two reasons. First, 28% of these workers are unaffected entirely, as they would not be able to claim universal credit even if they lost work, due to having more than £16,000 in assets or their partner having a sufficiently high income.

Second, for 22% of these workers, the two-child limit actually increases their replacement rate, as it decreases their income when in work but does not affect them when they are out of work, as they would be benefit capped if out of work.

For those who when out of work are eligible for universal credit but not benefit capped – 50% of working parents with three or more children – their replacement rate falls by 4 percentage points.

Naturally, removing the two-child limit would come at a cost. We estimate that removing the two-child limit would cost the government about £3.4 billion a year. For a sense of scale, this is equal to roughly 3% of the total working-age benefit budget; it is also approximately the same cost as freezing fuel duties for the next parliament, or cutting the basic rate of income tax by half a penny.

The indirect fiscal impacts of the two-child limit are more uncertain. Previous research has found that investments in young children can sometimes partly or even entirely pay for themselves by causing better outcomes for those children in later life.

If the same is true of benefit spending in the UK, removing the two-child limit may be less costly in the long run than its up-front cost suggests. However, there is very little evidence on this issue in the UK, though ongoing IFS research is looking to study it.

Institute for Fiscal Studies: Scottish Government faces major medium- and long-term budget challenges

New analysis by IFS researchers shows the stark funding challenges facing the Scottish Government, and the public services it is responsible for, over the next five years and beyond.

In the next two financial years, the budget for day-to-day non-benefit spending looks very tight:

After taking account of in-year funding top-ups this financial year, which under current plans will not be available in 2023–24, funding will fall by 1.6% in real terms in 2023–24 compared with this year. Even after adjusting for major one-off costs this year, such as council tax rebates, the reduction will still be 0.8%.
Official projections imply that funding will fall by a further 1.6% in real terms in 2024–25, and then grow only modestly over the next three years. This means that funding is set to be almost 2% lower in 2027–28 than in 2022–23.

Such cuts would imply difficult trade-offs for the Scottish Government. Increasing spending on health to meet rising costs and demand, and boosting spending on net zero policies could require cuts of around 13% to other public service spending between 2023 and 2027.

These are among the key findings of two pre-released chapters from the inaugural IFS Scottish Budget Report, focusing on the Scottish Government’s funding outlook and devolved income tax revenue performance. Other key findings include:

Medium-term outlook

The baseline projections above rely on Scottish Fiscal Commission (SFC) forecasts of a significant improvement in income tax revenues. This largely reflects faster expected growth in Scotland’s underlying income tax base relative to the rest of the UK, rather than the effects of tax rises announced in the Scottish Budget last month. If this faster growth doesn’t materialise, then the Scottish Government’s choices would be harder still, with funding for non-benefits spending in 2027–28 still 5% below 2022–23 levels.
The faster growth in Scotland’s tax base forecast for the next few years follows a period during which the tax base has grown more slowly than in the rest of the UK. Because of this, SFC forecasts imply that even by 2026–27, almost one-third of the yield from Scotland’s higher income tax rates will be offset by slower tax base growth since the devolution of income tax in 2016–17. This would still be a substantial improvement from this financial year though, for which the SFC estimates that revenues from Scotland’s income tax policy changes since devolution will be more than fully offset by slower underlying growth in the tax base.

Long-term outlook

While the Barnett formula used by the UK government to allocate funding is often thought to benefit Scotland, in the long term it is likely to lead to relatively smaller increases in funding for Scotland than for England. The speed of this ‘Barnett squeeze’ depends on the rate of growth in spending in England (both real-terms growth and that which merely offsets inflation), and the rate of population growth in Scotland relative to England.
Using long-term projections for inflation and GDP growth from the Office for Budget Responsibility, assuming public spending is held constant as a share of GDP, and taking into account population projections from the Office for National Statistics, we project Scottish Government funding per person would increase by an average of 1.2% per year in real terms over the 30 years between 2027–28 and 2057–58. This compares to an average of 1.4% in England over the same period. Under this scenario, spending per person in Scotland would fall from 124% of English levels in 2027–28, to 121% in 2032–33, and to 115% in 2057–58.
Faster real-terms spending growth in England to meet the rising costs of health and social care (which are expected to grow faster than GDP) would result in bigger absolute increases in funding for the Scottish Government, making it easier for it to meet these costs in Scotland. However, it would increase the Barnett squeeze on funding levels relative to England – making it harder for the Scottish Government to maintain enhanced levels of service provision over and above those in England.

Bee Boileau, a research economist at the IFS and an author of the report said: “Additional funding from the UK government and a forecast boost to devolved tax revenues mean the outlook for funding has improved a little since last May’s Resource Spending Review.

“But the picture is far from rosy. Official projections imply that funding for non-benefit spending is set to fall over the next two years and then grow only slowly over the following three years. Indeed, it would still be close to 2% below 2022–23 levels in 2027–28. And that assumes a significant improvement in the performance of Scotland’s devolved income tax revenues – without that, this funding would be close to 5% lower than this year in 2027–28.

If either of these scenarios were borne out, the Scottish Government would likely need to make significant cuts to a range of public services. Further big increases in devolved tax rates would be one way to avoid such cuts.

“The Scottish Government will instead be hoping for additional funding from the UK government – which may not be in vain as the UK government would also need to make cuts to many services if it sticks to the plans for spending it has pencilled in.’

David Phillips, an associate director at the IFS, and another author of the report said: ‘The Scottish Government’s long-term funding outlook beyond 2027–28 will also be determined, to a large extent, by UK government spending decisions via the Barnett formula.

“This formula is often seen to benefit the Scottish Government, by providing it with a much higher level of funding per person than is available for comparable services in England.

But this is a misunderstanding of the nature of the formula and its purpose. Because it provides the Scottish Government with a population-based share of funding changes planned for England, and Scotland starts with a higher-than-population share of funding, it delivers a smaller percentage increase in funding for Scotland than England.

This so-called Barnett squeeze will make it more difficult for the Scottish Government to meet rising costs and the demands on public services associated with an ageing population, and to maintain enhanced service provision relative to England, such as free personal care and free university education, in the longer term.”

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