COVID verdict: Governments’ response was ‘too little, too late’

Inquiry publishes second report and 19 recommendations, examining ‘Core UK decision-making and political governance’

The Chair of the UK Covid Inquiry, Baroness Heather Hallett, has today published her second report which concludes that the response to the pandemic by the United Kingdom’s four governments was often a case of ‘too little, too late’.

The report, ‘Core UK decision-making and political governance’ (Module 2), also concludes that while the various lockdowns of 2020 and 2021 undoubtedly saved lives, they only became inevitable because of the acts and omissions of all governments.

The devolved administrations were too reliant on the UK government to lead the response. 

Baroness Hallett is calling for the prompt and thorough implementation of 19 key recommendations. The recommendations must be considered during the development of all future pandemic preparedness strategies. 

They include the need for urgent reform and clarification of the structures for decision-making during emergencies within each of the four governments.

Other key recommendations include ensuring that decisions and their implications are clearly communicated to the public – laws and guidance must be easy to understand. There should be greater Parliamentary scrutiny of the use of emergency powers as well as improved consideration in an emergency of the impact that decisions might have on those most at risk.

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Baroness Hallett, Chair of the UK Covid-19 Inquiry, said: “Today I published my second report. It follows an investigation into the responses of the four governments of the UK to the Covid-19 pandemic.

“In early 2020, Covid-19 was a novel and deadly virus spreading rapidly around the country. All four governments failed to appreciate the scale of the threat or the urgency of response it demanded.

“When they did realise the scale of the threat, politicians and administrators in the UK government and the devolved administrations were presented with unenviable choices as to how to respond. Whatever decision they took there was often no right answer or good outcome. They also had to make decisions in conditions of extreme pressure. Nonetheless, I can summarise my findings of the response as ‘too little, too late’.

“The Inquiry has therefore identified a number of key lessons learned to inform the response to a future pandemic.

“In all, I make 19 key recommendations that I believe will better protect the UK in any future pandemic and improve decision-making in a crisis.”

eight page brief summary of the report can be found on the Inquiry’s website and is available in a variety of languages and accessible formats.

Module 2 of the UK Covid-19 Inquiry, the second of its 10 investigations, focuses on the UK’s governance and political decision-making during the Covid-19 pandemic.

Its investigation covers the actions and performance of the UK government in Westminster, as well as the devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, the focus of Modules 2A, 2B and 2C.

In total, 166 witnesses gave oral evidence. Nine weeks of public hearings featuring 80 witnesses were held in London in autumn and winter 2023.

A further 90 witnesses gave evidence in public hearings in Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast in the first half of 2024.

The Inquiry heard from serving and former senior politicians – including former Prime and First Ministers – leading scientists, key medical professionals, civil servants, relevant experts and others.

Following these hearings, conclusions have been reached and recommendations for changes carefully developed – all are published in today’s report which will be laid in Parliament.

Module 2 report: Key findings

  • All four governments failed to appreciate the scale of the threat or the urgency of response it demanded in the early part of 2020.
    • This was compounded, in part, by misleading assurances from the Department of Health and Social Care and the widely held view that the UK was well prepared for a pandemic. 
  • By the time the possibility of a mandatory lockdown was first considered, it was already too late and a lockdown had become unavoidable.The lockdowns in 2020 and 2021 undoubtedly saved lives, but only became inevitable because of the acts and omissions of the four governments.
  • The UK government introduced advisory restrictions on 16 March 2020, including self-isolation, household quarantine and social distancing. Had restrictions been introduced sooner, the mandatory lockdown from 23 March might have been shorter or not necessary at all.
  • This lack of urgency and the huge rise in infections made a mandatory lockdown inevitable. It should have been introduced one week earlier.
    • Had a mandatory lockdown been imposed on or immediately after 16 March 2020, modelling shows that in England alone there would have been approximately 23,000 fewer deaths in the first wave up until 1 July 2020. 
  • When entering the first lockdown, none of the four governments had a strategy for when or how they would exit the lockdown. None of the four governments gave enough attention to the possibility of a second wave, meaning there was very little contingency planning in place.
  • None of governments in the UK had adequately prepared for the challenges and risks of a national lockdown. They did not scrutinise sufficiently seriously its wider societal, workforce and economic impacts, in particular, the impact on the vulnerable and disadvantaged and impact of school closures on children’s education and their physical and mental health.
  • The Inquiry rejects the criticism that the four governments were wrong to impose a mandatory lockdown on 23 March 2020. All four governments received clear and compelling advice to do so. Without it, the growth in transmission would have led to an unacceptable loss of life. However, their failure to act promptly and effectively had put them in this position.
  • They all must now learn the lessons of the Covid-19 pandemic if they are to avoid lockdowns in future pandemics.

Baroness Hallett acknowledges the pressure on politicians and others during the pandemic to make tough decisions about how resources should be used. However, the Chair of the Inquiry also stresses that if the UK had been better prepared – as per the Module 1 report published July 2024 – the nation could have avoided some of the significant and long-lasting financial, economic and human costs of the Covid-19 pandemic. 

The Chair considers that all Module 2 report recommendations should be implemented in a timely manner. The Inquiry and the Chair will be monitoring the implementation of the recommendations.

The Inquiry’s next report – focusing on the Impact of Covid-19 pandemic on healthcare systems in the four nations of the UK (Module 3) will be published next year. A further six reports will follow in quick succession covering Modules 6 to 10, with the final report scheduled to be published no later than summer 2027.

The Inquiry’s next public hearings begin next week, Monday 24 November, with four weeks of oral evidence concerning the Module 9 investigation ‘Economic response’. The Inquiry will conclude all public hearings by March 2026 after hearing evidence across three weeks for ‘Impact on society’ (Module 10). 

The Covid-19 Bereaved Families for Justice campaign issued the following statement:

Governments ‘failed citizens’ with flawed pandemic planning

Inquiry publishes first report and 10 recommendations focused on pandemic resilience and preparedness

The Chair of the UK Covid-19 Inquiry, Baroness Heather Hallett, is urging the new UK government and the governments of Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland to implement promptly her 10 key recommendations following publication of the Inquiry’s report of its first investigation into the nation’s resilience and preparedness for the pandemic.

These recommendations, made public on Thursday 18 July 2024, include a major overhaul of how the UK government prepares for civil emergencies such as the Covid-19 pandemic.

Key recommendations include a radical simplification of civil emergency preparedness and resilience systems, holding a UK-wide pandemic response exercise at least every three years and the creation of a single, independent statutory body responsible for whole system preparedness and response.

It is the first of several reports setting out the Inquiry’s recommendations and findings.

Today the Inquiry has published its first report after examining the resilience and preparedness of the United Kingdom to respond to a pandemic. My report recommends fundamental reform of the way in which the UK government and the devolved administrations prepare for whole-system civil emergencies.

If the reforms I recommend are implemented, the nation will be more resilient and better able to avoid the terrible losses and costs to society that the Covid-19 pandemic brought.

I expect all my recommendations to be acted on, with a timetable to be agreed with the respective administrations. I, and my team, will be monitoring this closely.

Baroness Hallett, Chair of the Inquiry

Module 1 examined the state of the UK’s structures and the procedures in place to prepare for and respond to a pandemic.

Hearings for Module 1 were held in London in June and July 2023 and the Chair heard from current and former politicians as well as key scientists, experts, civil servants and bereaved family members.

Following these hearings, the Inquiry’s findings and recommendations are set out in the report published today. The publication of the first report has been welcomed by some of those who lost loved ones during the pandemic. Dr Alan Wightman from North Yorkshire, lost his mother in early-May 2020 to Covid-19 that she had acquired in her care home in Fife, Scotland.

My Mum was an 88-year-old widow, a dementia sufferer and a cancer survivor. She had been settled and looked after in her well-run home for 11 months before Covid got in, despite the best efforts of the staff. A number of the home’s residents were taken by Covid.

I congratulate Baroness Hallett and her Inquiry team for reaching this substantive milestone of issuing findings and recommendations from Module 1. To be at this point a mere 13 months after witnesses started giving evidence in this Module is very impressive. To have achieved that whilst simultaneously completing Module 2 and its three satellite Modules, plus having Module 3 ready to launch within the next three months, is truly exemplary.

Dr Wightman

In her findings, the Chair concludes that the UK’s system of building preparedness for the pandemic suffered from several significant flaws.

These include a flawed approach to risk assessment, a failure to fully learn from past civil emergency exercises and outbreaks of disease, and Ministers not receiving a broad enough range of scientific advice and failing to challenge the advice they did get.

Baroness Hallett acknowledges the pressure on politicians and others to make tough decisions about how resources should be used. However, she also stresses that if the UK had been better prepared, the nation could have avoided some of the significant and long-lasting financial, economic and human costs of the Covid-19 pandemic.

In summary her recommendations are:

  • A radical simplification of the civil emergency preparedness and resilience systems. This includes rationalising and streamlining the current bureaucracy and providing better, simpler Ministerial and official structures and leadership;
  • A new approach to risk assessment that provides for a better and more comprehensive evaluation of a wider range of actual risks;
  • A new UK-wide approach to the development of strategy, which learns lessons from the past and from regular civil emergency exercises and takes proper account of existing inequalities and vulnerabilities;
    Better systems of data collection and sharing in advance of future pandemics, and the commissioning of a wider range of research projects;
  • Holding a UK-wide pandemic response exercise at least every three years and publishing the outcome;
    Bringing in external expertise from outside government and the Civil Service to challenge and guard against the known problem of ‘groupthink’;
  • Publication of regular reports on the system of civil emergency preparedness and resilience;
  • Lastly and most importantly, the creation of a single, independent statutory body responsible for whole system preparedness and response. It will consult widely, for example with experts in the field of preparedness and resilience and the voluntary, community and social sector, and provide strategic advice to government and make recommendations.

The Chair believes that all 10 recommendations are reasonable and deliverable and all must be implemented in a timely manner. The Inquiry and the Chair will be monitoring the implementation of the recommendations and will hold those in power to account.

The Chair has today restated her aim to conclude all public hearings by summer 2026, and to publish reports with findings and recommendations as the Inquiry progresses.

The Inquiry’s next report – focusing on Core UK decision-making and political governance – including in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland (Modules 2, 2A, 2B and 2C) – is expected to be published in 2025.

Future reports will focus on specific areas, including:

  • Modules 2, 2A, 2B, 2C: Core UK decision-making and political governance – including Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland
  • Module 3: Healthcare systems
  • Module 4: Vaccines and therapeutics
  • Module 5: Procurement – procurement and distribution of key equipment and supplies
  • Module 6: The care sector
  • Module 7: Test, trace, and isolate programmes
  • Module 8: Children and young people
  • Module 9: Economic response to the pandemic

For more details of these modules visit the Inquiry’s website.

The Chair is also examining the best way to fulfil her Terms of Reference and investigate the impact of the pandemic on the population of the UK. This will cover a wide range of those affected and include the impact on mental health.

TUC: Covid Inquiry Report is a “moment of truth for the country” as report confirms impact of austerity on UK preparedness and resilience

Report confirms that public services were under huge strain even before Covid struck

  • Baroness Hallett says public health, NHS and social care sector’s capacity to respond to pandemic was “constrained” by funding and negatively impacted by “severe staff shortages” and infrastructure “not fit for purpose”
  • Report warns that not investing “in systems of protection” will impact on the UK’s “preparedness and resilience” in a future pandemic 

Responding to the UK Covid-19 Inquiry Module 1 report today (Thursday), TUC General Secretary Paul Nowak said:  “This is a moment of truth and reflection for the country. 

“Baroness Hallett’s report confirms that austerity left the UK underprepared for the pandemic. 

“Faced with the biggest crisis since the Second World War our defences were down as a result of severe spending cuts. 

“We owe it to those who lost their lives – and to those workers who put their lives at risk – to make sure this never happens again. 

“Strong public services – and a properly supported workforce – are vital for the nation’s health. As Baroness Hallett rightly points out the cost of investing in ‘systems for our protection’ is ‘vastly outweighed’ by the cost of not doing so.”  

Commenting on the report’s finding that inequality put certain communities at disproportionate risk during the pandemic, Paul added: 

“This report lays bare how inequality fuelled the spread of Covid-19.  Low-income, disabled and BME people were far more likely to be infected and die from the virus.  As Baroness Hallett warns inequality is a huge risk to the whole of the UK.” 

Impact of austerity 

Baroness Hallett writes on page 2 of her report: ‘Public services, particularly health and social care, were running close to, if not beyond, capacity in normal times. 

[…] in the area of preparedness and resilience, money spent on systems for our protection is vital and will be vastly outweighed by the cost of not doing so.’ 

Baroness Hallett writes on page 122 of her report: ‘The Inquiry also heard that there were severe staff shortages and that a significant amount of the hospital infrastructure was not fit for purpose. England’s social care sector faced similar issues. This combination of factors had a directly negative impact on infection control measures and on the ability of the NHS and the care sector to ‘surge up’ during a pandemic.’ 

Baroness Hallett writes on page 123 of her report: ‘Issues of funding are political decisions that properly fall to elected politicians. However, it remains the case that the surge capacity of the four nations’ public health and healthcare systems to respond to the pandemic was constrained by their funding.’ 

Baroness Hallett writes on page 127 of her report: ‘Some witnesses to the Inquiry described the prioritisation and reprioritisation of limited resources as a cause of inaction. This is a widely recurring theme in the evidence.’ 

Impact of inequality 

Baroness Hallett writes on page 70 of her report: ‘Resilience depends on having a resilient population. The existence and persistence of vulnerability in the population is a long-term risk to the UK.’ 

‘[…] as the UK entered the Covid-19 pandemic, there were “substantial systematic health inequalities by socio-economic status, ethnicity, area-level deprivation, region, social excluded minority groups and inclusion health groups.”’ 

Baroness Hallett writes on page 71 of her report: ‘Covid-19 was not an ‘equality opportunity virus’. It resulted in a higher a likelihood of sickness and death for people who are most vulnerable in society. It was the views of Professors Bambra and Marmot that: 

“In short, the UK entered the pandemic with its public services depleted, health improvement stalled, health inequalities increased and health among the poorest people in a state of decline.”’