

Business and Trade Committee

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# UK-EU relations a decade on

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Fourth Report of Session 2026–27

HC 126

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# Business and Trade Committee

The Business and Trade Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Department for Business and Trade and its associated public bodies.

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## Publication

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# Summary

On the 23 June 2026, the UK marks ten years since the Brexit referendum and the decision to leave the European Union.

The impact of Brexit on the UK's economy is hotly debated. On the one hand, the OBR estimates leaving the EU has led to a long-term reduction in UK GDP by 4% compared to staying in the EU. On the other, the UK has begun to take its own path in regulating industry in sectors like Artificial Intelligence, and has used its new freedoms to become one of the most economically integrated, non-regional partners in the Indo-Pacific region, signing deals with Australia, India, the Gulf Cooperation Council and South Korea, and acceding to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement on Trans-Pacific Partnership. Together these new deals are expected to add around £15 billion to UK GDP annually.

In trade, however, geography matters. The EU remains the single most important market for British businesses. The Government therefore committed in its manifesto to Reset the UK's relations with Europe within three clear red lines: no return to the single market, the customs union, or freedom of movement. Within this framework, the Committee set out 21 policy recommendations to build closer UK-EU ties and boost the economy. Subsequently, the Prime Minister and the President of the EU Commission held a summit in May 2025 which mapped the terrain for further cooperation and potential negotiations. This was crystallised in the Common Understanding, the Security and Defence Partnership, and the three priority agreements on steel, fisheries, and energy.

In our regular stocktakes on the UK's Reset with the EU, we initially found a welcome for the Government's approach. Thirteen months on, however, stakeholder opinion in the UK has shifted. The prevailing view is that the Reset has been slow to deliver. At the time of publication:

- The three priority agreements on steel, fisheries and energy appear the most substantive elements of the Reset to date. Yet, the fisheries agreement was not universally welcomed by the UK's fishers. The positive progress made on steel tariffs is also likely to be short lived, given the EU's impending changes to its steel tariffs from 1 July 2026.

- Only one of the six core Common Understanding commitments have been agreed – the UK’s association to the Erasmus+ student exchange programme, at a cost to the UK of £570 million for the 2027/2028 academic year. Four are still in progress. One has failed. None of the three wider UK ambitions set out in the Common Understanding, namely help for touring artists, improved business mobility, and an agreement on the mutual recognition of professional qualifications, have been materially advanced.
- Beyond political signalling, it is also unclear what the Security and Defence Partnership delivers, given it does not commit to specific actions or deliverables, and there is no mechanism through which we can judge the Government’s delivery of its contents.
- Four of our 21 recommendations have been completed, 11 are in progress and on six, there has been no progress.

More broadly, we have heard five key concerns about the Government’s approach:

- Frustration at the Reset’s ‘rhetoric-reality gap’; on the one hand, Government ministers have not pulled their punches about the negative economic impact of Brexit. But on the other, delivery of their Reset measures, even in an optimistic scenario, will add just 0.5% to the UK’s GDP by 2040.
- Limited progress in the most important area of defence and defence industrial policy, despite the war raging on the European continent, the escalation of hybrid warfare by Russia, and the clear message from the United States that European NATO partners must take the lead on conventional defence. Against these imperatives, the failure to secure agreement on UK participation in the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) defence procurement scheme was especially disappointing.
- Frustration with the significant delay in starting negotiations for a deal on electricity trading which could cut prices at a time when the UK is battling the highest electricity prices in the G7, and the war in Iran is driving energy prices higher.
- The lack of a clear strategy for the Reset beyond the 2026 summit. In our conversations with EU Member State officials and EU representatives in Brussels, Paris, Berlin, and Dublin, we heard time and again how our European allies are simply unclear about what the UK wants. In recent months, UK ministers, the Prime Minister and the Chancellor, have been more explicit about their desire for deeper

UK-EU integration. Yet there is still no strategic case for the Reset, regulatory roadmap or any accompanying policy documents which set out the UK's end goal.

- The Government's proposals are not without controversy. Reductions in trade friction, such as those achieved through the proposed Sanitary and Phytosanitary agreement, were generally welcomed for instance. But views differ about the virtues of wholesale UK "dynamic alignment" with EU regulations.

It is unlikely that the current Reset will address these concerns. As such, to aid the public and parliamentary debate in the months to come, we set out the basic models for deepening ties, together with the trade-offs entailed. Although there is no obvious "off the shelf" solution, there are examples from which the UK can learn. It is now essential that ministers get off the fence and provide leadership about the future path for UK-EU relations in order to improve trade and achieve the Government's plans to deliver growth to the UK.

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# Introduction

1. On 15 May 2025, the Committee published its report “How to strengthen UK-EU Relations: Policy Priorities for the Summit” with 21 recommendations on how to deepen UK-EU relations within the framework of the Government’s red lines.<sup>1</sup>
2. Four days later, on 19 May 2025, the UK Government and the European Commission formally launched the “Reset” of UK-EU relations at a joint leader’s summit in Lancaster House. The summit re-affirmed existing UK-EU treaties<sup>2</sup> but went further, agreeing the Security and Defence Partnership,<sup>3</sup> the “Common Understanding,”<sup>4</sup> and sectoral agreements on three key issues; steel, fisheries and energy.<sup>5</sup> Together, these established the framework for a new UK-EU strategic partnership.
3. The purpose of this “stocktake” report is to assess progress made on the UK-EU Reset against our recommendations, and against the UK Government’s own objectives. This report is also written to help guide the debate about priorities in the medium term.
4. To inform our thinking we met a range of interested parties, held two public oral evidence sessions, invited stakeholders to submit written evidence, and travelled to Paris, Berlin, Brussels, the Port of Dover and Dublin where we met businesses, think-tanks, Members of Parliament and Ministers. We heard directly from the UK Ministers and officials responsible for the Reset’s delivery including the Minister of State for Trade, Sir Chris Bryant MP. We are grateful to all those who contributed to the inquiry, helped shape the Committee’s thinking, and therefore the contents of this report.

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1 Business and Trade Committee, Sixth Report of Session 2024–25, [How to strengthen UK-EU Relations: Policy Priorities for the Summit](#), HC 908

2 The Withdrawal Agreement, the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), and the Windsor Framework

3 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Ministry of Defence, [Security and defence partnership between the European Union and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland](#), published, gov.uk, 19 May 2025

4 Cabinet Office, [UK-EU Summit – Common Understanding](#), gov.uk, updated 22 December 2025

5 European Commission, [Questions and answers on the package agreed at EU-United Kingdom Summit](#), 19 May 2025

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# 1 A New Strategic Partnership

5. The agreements struck at the May 2025 Leaders' Summit—the Common Understanding, the Security and Defence Partnership, and the three priority sectoral agreements—provide the substance of the EU Reset. The Common Understanding and the Security and Defence Partnership are non-binding, political agreements, which facilitate further dialogues and negotiations. We discuss each of these components of the Reset in turn below.

## The Common Understanding

6. The Common Understanding is the framework for closer cooperation between the EU and the UK outside of foreign affairs and defence. It identified policy areas of mutual interest including trade, health, security, law enforcement, and irregular or illegal migration, and specified several areas on which the UK and EU agreed to explore ways to deepen their relationship:<sup>6</sup>
  - a. Six areas for were put forward for further negotiations and for potential new binding agreements:
    - i. UK participation in the EU's Security Action for Europe (SAFE) defence procurement scheme;
    - ii. A Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) agreement to reduce border frictions on agrifoods trade (a known UK objective);
    - iii. Linkage of UK-EU Emissions Trading Schemes (ETS) and mutual waivers from Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanisms (CBAM);
    - iv. Enhanced cooperation on electricity trading with possible UK re-entry into the EU's Internal Energy Market (IEM);

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6 For areas like health, law enforcement, and irregular migration, the Common Understanding did not include formal commitments to specific actions. Both sides largely reaffirmed existing commitments to ongoing cooperation or to explore new ways this could be done, under existing UK-EU structures, like the Trade and Cooperation Agreement.

- v. A youth mobility scheme (a known EU objective);<sup>7</sup> and
  - vi. UK association to the Erasmus+ student exchange (a known EU objective)<sup>8</sup>
- b. Three wider UK Reset objectives were identified for further work,<sup>9</sup> though no formal actions or negotiations were proposed:
- i. Visas for touring artists;
  - ii. Improved business mobility; and
  - iii. An agreement on the mutual recognition of professional qualifications.
- c. Shared commitments to enhanced cooperation on security and defence, which resulted in the Security and Defence Partnership.

**Table 1: Overview of the Common Understanding areas put forward for further negotiation and potential binding agreements and known wider UK ambitions to explore further UK-EU cooperation, alongside a summary of the progress made since the inaugural May 2025 Reset summit.**

	UK-EU Common Understanding Commitment	Negotiation Status
Six Core Commitments to Explore		
1.	UK participation in EU’s Security Action for Europe (SAFE) defence rearmament and procurement scheme.	Negotiations Failed.
2.	A Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) agreement to reduce border checks and trade frictions imposed on agricultural products.	Negotiations are in progress.
3.	Linkage of UK and EU Emissions Trading Schemes (ETS) to create a uniform carbon market and allow for waivers from respective Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanisms (CBAM).	Negotiations are in progress.

7 European Commission, COM (2024) 169 final, [Recommendation for a Council Decision authorising the opening of negotiations for an agreement between the European Union and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on youth mobility](#), 18 April 2024

8 European Commission, COM (2024) 169 final, [Recommendation for a Council Decision authorising the opening of negotiations for an agreement between the European Union and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on youth mobility](#), 18 April 2024

9 The Labour Party Manifesto 2024, [Our Plan to Change Britain](#), 13 June 2024

4.	Enhanced cooperation on electricity trading arrangements and possible UK re-entry in the EU's Internal Energy Market (IEM).	Negotiations have not yet begun.
5.	A Youth Experience Scheme to support youth mobility on a visa-based arrangement.	Negotiations are in progress.
6.	UK association to the Erasmus+ student exchange programme.	Completed.
<b>Wider UK Ambitions to Explore</b>		
7.	Visas for Touring Artists.	No progress.
8.	Improved Business Mobility.	No progress.
9.	Agreement on the Mutual Recognition of Professional Qualifications.	No progress.

7. Thirteen months on, many elements of the Reset have yet to be agreed. This includes the negotiations on the SPS and ETS deals, which are due for completion in 2026, and expected to be operational by mid-2027. Even if agreed, however, their benefits (an estimated 0.24% cumulative increase to UK GDP by 2040),<sup>10</sup> may not be felt for some time. Indeed, the UK in a Changing Europe told us that it is unlikely the UK will feel many tangible economic benefits before the next general election.<sup>11</sup>
8. Businesses need policy certainty and clear guidance to make informed decisions. Some of those who submitted written evidence said that while the broad direction of the Reset was communicated well, there was insufficient detail on which to prepare effectively for future changes,<sup>12</sup> and that operational decisions cannot be made based on high-level political commitments.<sup>13</sup>

9. **CONCLUSION**  
The Common Understanding is a significant positive step to improve UK-EU relations. Thirteen months on, however, an underwhelming amount of progress has been made. So far, the Reset has delivered limited meaningful impact.

10. **RECOMMENDATION**  
We recommend that Government act quickly to make more progress on the Reset. It must also ensure future such agreements are accompanied with clear policy workplans and milestones for delivering outcomes.

10 Office for Budget Responsibility, [Briefing Paper No.9 Forecasting Productivity](#), 26 November 2025, page 57

11 UK in a Changing Europe ([EUT0023](#))

12 ABTA ([EUT0017](#))

13 The Competere Foundation ([EUT0044](#))

## ***Delivery of the six core Common Understanding commitments***

### ***1. EU Security Action for Europe (SAFE) Defence Procurement (FAILED)***

- 11.** The Security Action for Europe (SAFE) scheme is a new EU fund that provides up to €150 billion in loans to Member States to support their defence procurement.<sup>14</sup> Conditions are imposed on the use of the loans to limit the participation of non-EU based suppliers; no more than 35% by value of costs can come from outside the EU, European Economic Area, or Ukraine. These industrial opportunities could be increased for companies based in non-EU countries that have signed a Security and Defence Partnership with the EU (like the UK) and secured a further formal agreement with the EU, permitting their increased access to the scheme.
- 12.** The UK sought participation in SAFE. Enhanced defence cooperation was welcomed by stakeholders, for example Best for Britain,<sup>15</sup> not least because of United States' demands that NATO's European members now lead on conventional defence in Europe and step-up defence and resilience spending to 5.0% of GDP. Talks between the UK and EU collapsed however in November 2025. The Minister for EU Relations said the UK could not secure an agreement that was in the national interest.<sup>16</sup> This was confirmed to the Committee by the Minister for Trade in a letter on 8 May 2026.<sup>17</sup> The issue at stake was reportedly the EU's request for the UK to pay up to €6.5 billion in a one-off participation fee, in return for preferential access to the scheme; €6 billion more than the UK's proposed €300 million.<sup>18</sup>
- 13.** Oriël Petry, Senior Vice-President and Group Head of Public Affairs, Airbus UK, told us that Airbus was disappointed that UK participation in SAFE had not been secured,<sup>19</sup> but she did not view this set back as a total bar to defence cooperation.<sup>20</sup> Defence stakeholders, including Airbus, stressed that the UK should pursue bilateral Member State partnerships outside of SAFE to strengthen security cooperation, such as the Trinity

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14 European Commission, [SAFE: Security Action for Europe](#), (accessed 13 March 2026)

15 Written evidence received for the Committee's inquiry into UK trade with the US, India, and EU, Best for Britain ([UKT0013](#)), HC 996, August 2025

16 [Statement on UK-EU Relations](#), HCWS1114, [1 December 2025](#)

17 Letter from the Minister of State for Trade regarding information requested following the Committee's evidence session on 9 March on trade with the US and EU, [8 May 2026](#)

18 Politico, [UK and EU hit impasse in defence deal talks](#), 20 November 2025

19 Oral evidence taken on 13 January 2026, [Q213](#), [Oriël Petry]

20 Oral evidence taken on 13 January 2026, [Q214](#), [Oriël Petry]

House and Lunna House Agreements, and the Kensington Treaty.<sup>21, 22</sup> In addition, the UK has begun exploring the Multilateral Defence Mechanism for coordinating defence purchases with the Netherlands and Finland.<sup>23</sup> Nonetheless, ADS group, which represents the defence industry, told us that the UK should seek an Administrative Agreement with the European Defence Agency, to formally link the UK into the European defence cooperation architecture.<sup>24</sup>

14. At the European Political Community summit in May 2026, the UK and EU also agreed to enter further negotiations on the UK’s involvement in the bloc’s €90bn “Loan for Ukraine”.<sup>25</sup> This would allow Ukraine to spend significant funds on UK-made defence equipment, in return for a UK financial contribution to the EU. The timing of further talks is unclear, though both sides agreed it “would be a major step forward in the UK-EU defence industrial relationship”.<sup>26</sup> Canada is also leading the creation of a multinational financial institution to help finance defence and security capabilities among allied countries, known as the Defence, Security and Resilience Bank (DSRB).<sup>27</sup> The UK’s views towards involvement in the DSRB are currently unknown.

15. **CONCLUSION**

Failure to secure UK participation in SAFE was a disappointing outcome. It should not preclude further defence cooperation between the UK and the EU. The Committee agrees that the cost of UK participation, if reported correctly, was too high. On that basis, we agree with the Government’s decision not to participate at this stage.

21 Oral evidence taken on 13 January 2026, [Q216](#), [Oriel Petry]

22 The [Trinity House Agreement](#), reached in October 2024, and [Kensington Treaty](#), reached in July 2025, were bilateral agreements between the UK and Germany to enhance defence cooperation. The [Lunna House Agreement](#) was a separate defence cooperation agreement reached with Norway in 2025, underpinned by a £10 billion commitment from Norway to purchase British-made Type-26 anti-submarine frigates.

23 HM Treasury, [Joint statement from Finland, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom on joint defence financing and procurement](#), gov.uk, 17 March 2026

24 ADS Group ([EUT0042](#))

25 Prime Minister’s Office, 10 Downing Street, [Joint statement following a meeting between the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, and UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer](#), 4 May 2026

26 Prime Minister’s Office, 10 Downing Street, [Joint statement following a meeting between the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, and UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer](#), 4 May 2026

27 Department of Finance Canada, [Canada welcomes progress towards the establishment of the Defence, Security and Resilience Bank and hosting its headquarters](#), 29 April 2026

**16. RECOMMENDATION**

We recommend that the Government re-open negotiations on UK participation in future rounds of SAFE and prioritise inclusion in the EU’s “Loan for Ukraine”. In the interim, it must continue to pursue bilateral defence partnerships with EU Member States, building upon previous successes such as the Trinity House Agreement and explore the case for seeking a consolidation of the Multilateral Defence Mechanism and the Canadian-led Defence Security and Resilience Bank. We ask the Government to outline its plans for enhanced defence cooperation with Member States going forward.

*2. Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement (SPS) (In Progress)*

- 17.** Since 1 January 2021, British agricultural exports to the EU, such as dairy, fish, and red meat, have faced full EU border document checks and up to 30% have faced physical inspection.<sup>28</sup> The National Farmers’ Union (NFU), estimates export volumes of UK beef, dairy, and chicken to the EU market, were down 24%, 10%, and 41%, respectively, between 2019 and 2025, partially due to these new frictions.<sup>29</sup> Toby Ovens, Managing Director of Broughton Transport, a firm which specialises in agrifood trade with the EU, gave an example when three separate certificates and a total of 26 stamps were needed for a single lorry to cross the border.<sup>30</sup> In another incident, incorrect UK paperwork led to a 27 day delay at the French border;<sup>31</sup> Toby Ovens told us this resulted in “The invoice totalled just over £16,000 to the customer for the vehicle to be sat there for the best part of a month.”<sup>32</sup>
- 18.** The proposed SPS agreement would reduce the need and frequency for some of these checks,<sup>33</sup> saving a single lorry of mixed products, “£1000’s in reduced costs”.<sup>34</sup> We also heard from our Irish Oireachtas counterpart committee, during our visit to Dublin, how the SPS deal would materially improve trade flows between the UK mainland and the island of Ireland.
- 19.** The deal would require the UK to align dynamically with all relevant EU SPS standards and regulations.<sup>35</sup> On the 9 March 2026, ten months following the SPS announcement, the UK Government published the

28 Cabinet Office, [UK-EU Summit Explainer](#), gov.uk, updated 22 December 2025

29 National Farmers’ Union ([EUT0022](#))

30 Oral evidence taken on 13 January 2026, [Q167](#), [Toby Ovens]

31 Oral evidence taken on 13 January 2026, [Q159](#), [Toby Ovens]

32 Oral evidence taken on 13 January 2026, [Q163](#), [Toby Ovens]

33 Under the SPS agreement, the UK is only permitted a “short list of limited exceptions” from EU standards, to preserve the integrity of the EU single market.

34 Cabinet Office, [UK-EU Summit – Common Understanding](#), gov.uk, updated 22 December 2025

35 Cabinet Office, [UK-EU Summit – Common Understanding](#), gov.uk, updated 22 December 2025

potential legislation in scope, highlighting areas like nutritional labelling and agri-food marketing standards, where the UK may be required to align with EU standards.<sup>36</sup>

20. Dynamic alignment and the potential loss of UK regulatory autonomy entailed, has caused concern amongst UK stakeholders, including the NFU, the Scotch Whisky Association, and the Food and Drink Federation.<sup>37</sup> Tom Bradshaw, President of the NFU, told us that while reducing border friction was in the UK's interests, the NFU initially opposed dynamic alignment to achieve it.<sup>38</sup> He said that the deal was not an automatic win, and could be counterproductive, particularly without derogations in areas like pesticide usage, which could prevent some UK crops being sold from the date of realignment.<sup>39</sup> As negotiations have yet to conclude, the potential impact on UK businesses is unclear. The NFU has called for the UK to secure appropriate transition requirements and timelines to minimise the significant economic impact on UK farms under the deal.<sup>40</sup>

21. **CONCLUSION**

A Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) agreement with the EU is on balance in the UK's interest. It will help support increased trade in agricultural goods. However, greater transparency and guidance is needed on its potential impacts on affected businesses. Clarity is also required on the future implications of EU legislation for UK businesses under an SPS arrangement, particularly under dynamic alignment. Business decisions are being made now which risk falling foul of the deal's eventual requirements.

22. **RECOMMENDATION**

We recommend that the Government commit to consult with businesses on SPS throughout the Reset. At the conclusion of its SPS negotiations with the EU, ministers must publish a detailed and comprehensive SPS agreement implementation plan. This plan should set out how it will provide support for businesses to ensure compliance with SPS requirements.

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36 Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs, [UK-EU SPS Agreement – Legislation in scope](#), gov.uk, 9 March 2026

37 National Farmers' Union ([EUT0022](#)), Scotch Whisky Association ([EUT0035](#)), Food and Drink Federation ([EUT0028](#))

38 Oral evidence taken on 13 January 2026, [Q225](#), [Tom Bradshaw]

39 Oral evidence taken on 13 January 2026, [Q226](#), [Tom Bradshaw]

40 National Farmers' Union ([EUT0022](#))

### 3. Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) Linkage & Carbon Border Taxes: (In Progress)

23. Emissions Trading Schemes (ETS) apply a “carbon price” to certain products to help reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Differences in carbon-pricing between markets are adjusted using “Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanisms” (CBAM), to ensure a level playing field. Today, the UK and EU operate independent emissions trading schemes, have different carbon prices, and independent CBAM measures. The EU’s CBAM took effect on 1 Jan 2026, covering six sectors, including electricity and steel.<sup>41</sup> The UK’s CBAM is due to come into force from 1 January 2027, and does not cover electricity.<sup>42</sup>
24. The Government believes that the misalignment in ETS schemes will require new levies on up to £7 billion of bilateral trade.<sup>43</sup> The EU and UK have committed to reach an agreement by the time of the 2026 UK-EU Summit, linking the UK and EU Emissions Trading Schemes to create a uniform carbon market and eliminate CBAM charges.<sup>44</sup> This proposal was welcomed by stakeholders, such as Deloitte who noted it would provide a more constructive and simplified commercial environment for trade, particularly in emission-intensive sectors such as steel.<sup>45</sup>

#### 25. CONCLUSION

We welcome the ambition to conclude talks on an Emissions Trading Scheme agreement by the time of the 2026 UK-EU summit. Linking UK-EU Emissions Trading Schemes will deliver mutual benefits to businesses. Mutual Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) waivers will also support trade in emission-intensive sectors and support joint progress towards environmental commitments and greenhouse gas reductions.

#### 26. RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that the Government move as quickly as possible to conclude the ETS linkage agreement. Once negotiations have concluded, it should seek provisional application of the agreement before its formal ratification. This would allow industry to feel its benefits, as soon as possible.

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41 European Commission, [Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism](#), (accessed 13 March 2026)

42 His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, [Carbon border adjustment mechanism \(CBAM\): Policy Summary](#), gov.uk, updated 9 April 2026

43 Cabinet Office, [UK-EU Summit Explainer](#), gov.uk, updated 22 December 2025

44 Oral evidence taken by the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee on 28 January 2026, [Q415](#), [Nick Thomas-Symonds MP]

45 Written evidence received for the Committee’s inquiry into UK trade with the US, India, and EU, Deloitte ([UKT0046](#)), HC 996, August 2025

#### 4. Electricity Trading Arrangements (In Progress)

- 27.** The UK left the EU’s Internal Electricity Market and electricity trading arrangements on 1 January 2021. This changed the rules on how power is traded and exchanged across the UK and EU electricity markets. In turn, this increased inefficiencies and costs. Decoupling has cost the electricity interconnector fleet €350 million a year (roughly £308 million), which is increasing to an estimated €550 million a year (roughly £483 million) by 2040.<sup>46, 47</sup> Matt Hinde, Head of International Policy and Engagement at the National Grid, told us that overall decoupling had increased wholesale UK electricity prices by 0.7%.<sup>48</sup> These inefficiencies also made UK investment in renewables infrastructure more difficult at a time when the war in Iran is compounding high UK energy prices.
- 28.** Sir Chris Bryant, Minister for Trade, confirmed in oral evidence that the Government was considering the impact of higher energy costs on the UK’s economy,<sup>49</sup> and officials confirmed that preliminary work was ongoing within Government on what support could be offered to businesses.<sup>50</sup> The IMF’s April 2026 World Economic Outlook predicted a large negative effect on UK growth because of its energy-import dependence.<sup>51</sup> A potential agreement on electricity trading and IEM participation was therefore welcomed by stakeholders including the Centre for Inclusive Trade Policy and UK Trade Policy Observatory, not least because high energy prices are a drag on UK productivity.<sup>52</sup>
- 29.** Mr Hinde told us that negotiations could conclude within the next few years, if there is “political will to do it”.<sup>53</sup> In the interim, UK electricity prices would remain higher than if a deal was reached.<sup>54</sup> The status of talks is unknown. The EU only formally adopted its negotiating mandate on 30 March 2026,<sup>55</sup> and it is unclear if talks have begun.<sup>56</sup>

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46 Oral evidence taken on 13 January 2026, [Q219](#), [Matt Hinde]

47 Conversion of euros to pound sterling are based on His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs published exchange rates for January 2026. £1 is equivalent to €1.1382

48 Oral evidence taken on 13 January 2026, [Q219](#), [Matt Hinde]

49 Oral evidence taken on 9 March 2026, [Q358](#), [Sir Chris Bryant MP]

50 Oral evidence taken on 9 March 2026, [Q360](#), [Kate Joseph]

51 International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook, [Global Economy in the Shadow of War](#), April 2026, Chapter 1, page 10

52 Written evidence received for the Committee’s inquiry into UK trade with the US, India, and EU, UK Trade Policy Observatory and Centre for Inclusive Trade Policy ([UKT0047](#)), August 2025

53 Oral evidence taken on 13 January 2026, [Q220](#), [Matt Hinde]

54 Oral evidence taken on 13 January 2026, [Q223](#), [Matt Hinde]

55 European Council, EU-UK relations: [Council greenlights talks on electricity and cohesion deals, as well as UK’s participation in Erasmus+ for 2027](#), 30 March 2026

56 Cabinet Office and Department for Business and Trade, ([EUTO052](#))

30.

**CONCLUSION**

The current electricity trading arrangements with the EU have caused market inefficiencies and increased UK energy costs. Reducing these costs through an agreement with the EU will provide significant benefits to UK businesses and consumers and support the broader UK and EU energy transitions towards renewables.

31.

**CONCLUSION**

The need for a UK-EU agreement on energy trading is clear. The current situation in Iran has compounded the need for a rapid agreement to be reached. We note that negotiations have been too slow to start and the timelines for completion are too long.

32.

**RECOMMENDATION**

We recommend that the Government prioritises negotiations on a UK-EU agreement on energy trading, with the aim of reaching an agreement as soon as possible.

### *5. Youth Experience Scheme (In Progress)*

33.

Alongside Erasmus+, the Common Understanding outlined the ambition to negotiate a youth experience scheme. This would allow UK and EU young people to move to live and work in the EU or UK on a temporary basis using a short-term visa. This was positively received by stakeholders, such as the Law Society, who noted it should ensure “that young professionals and trainee lawyers can gain work experience in the UK and across the EU” and that would have a positive impact for individuals, in the EU and the UK.<sup>57</sup> The Centre for European Reform estimated in 2024 that a “high” ambition scheme could add up to 0.45% to UK GDP.<sup>58</sup>

34.

The proposed scheme however, may raise UK inward migration.<sup>59</sup> The Government says any scheme will be subject to visa requirements, appropriate time limits, and an agreed number of places.<sup>60</sup> The UK runs comparable schemes with 13 other countries, including Australia and New Zealand, which the Minister for Trade told us the UK wanted to replicate.<sup>61</sup> By contrast, the EU is reportedly seeking no cap on the number of places, an exemption for participants from the UK’s NHS surcharge, and for EU

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57 The Law Society ([EUTO021](#))

58 Centre for European Reform, John Springford, [The gap between the Brexit reset rhetoric and the reality](#), published 10 December 2024

59 Written evidence received for the Committee’s inquiry into UK trade with the US, India, and EU, Best for Britain ([UKT0013](#)), August 2025

60 Cabinet Office, [Minister Nick Thomas-Symonds Speech at the UK-EU Parliamentary Partnership Assembly Plenary - 17 November](#), gov.uk, 18 November 2025

61 Oral evidence taken on 9 March 2026, [Q410](#), [Sir Chris Bryant MP]

students to access UK universities on fees equivalent to “home students”.<sup>62</sup> This mismatch has the potential to cause significant delays in finding an agreement.

**35. CONCLUSION**

We note there are potential benefits for the UK from a Youth Experience Scheme with the EU, economically and culturally. We recognise however there is a mismatch between the UK and the EU ambitions.

**36. RECOMMENDATION**

We therefore recommend the Government sets out the UK ambitions for the agreement on a Youth Experience Scheme. This should set out the overall numbers of participants allowed, the visa timeframes, visa requirements, and its position on access to home fee rates at UK universities.

## *6. Erasmus+ Student Exchange Programme (Completed)*

- 37.** Erasmus+ is an EU-led programme that provides grant funding for international placements and partnership projects for organisations working in education, training, youth, and sport.<sup>63</sup> Participants in the scheme receive funding to conduct work training or complete study placements abroad in eligible countries. The UK’s Department for Education oversees the scheme and is in discussions with the British Council to support its implementation, as the appointed UK National Agency.<sup>64</sup>
- 38.** During Brexit negotiations, the UK rejected continued participation in Erasmus, because membership was too expensive. The UK’s annual contribution was expected to reach £600 million.<sup>65</sup> The Common Understanding, however, outlined a shared ambition to negotiate the UK’s re-entry. This was agreed on 17 December 2025, for the 2027/28 academic year, at an estimated cost of £570 million.<sup>66</sup> Further UK financial contributions, and participation, may be agreed at a later stage once the EU has set the parameters of the Erasmus+ scheme during its 2028–2034

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62 The Guardian, [Youth mobility scheme disagreement hampering reset of UK-EU relations](#), 12 May 2026

63 European Commission, [Erasmus+ EU Programme for education, training youth, and sport](#), (accessed 18 March 2026)

64 Department for Education, [Overview of the Erasmus+ programme](#), gov.uk, updated 1 June 2026

65 [Turing Scheme](#), UIN132973, answered 13 January 2021

66 Cabinet Office and Department for Culture, Media, and Sport, [Young people from all backgrounds to get opportunity to study abroad as UK-EU deal unlocks Erasmus+](#), gov.uk, 17 December 2025

budgetary cycle.<sup>67</sup> The Government has yet to publish in full the expected UK economic benefits or otherwise, from its participation. ADS Group told us this was “the most significant achievement” of the Reset to date, providing work and study opportunities for thousands of young people across Europe.<sup>68</sup>

39.

#### CONCLUSION

We welcome the UK re-joining the Erasmus+ scheme.

To support transparency, we recommend that the Government set out the underlying data to support the UK’s decision to rejoin, a full cost-benefit analysis of long-term membership of Erasmus+, and its view on continued UK association as part of the 2028–2034 budgetary cycle.

## Progress outside the six core Common Understanding commitments

### *7. Help for Touring Artists (No Progress)*

40. Following Brexit, touring artists have faced challenges in securing visas and permits to work in the EU.<sup>69</sup> The Common Understanding highlighted that both sides would continue their efforts to support cultural exchanges, including the activities of touring artists.<sup>70</sup> No specific actions were given in the Common Understanding, and to date, the Reset has delivered no improvements, with the sector still facing increased costs and bureaucracy.<sup>71</sup> Creative Industries are one of the UK’s eight growth driving sectors identified in the Government’s Industrial Strategy.<sup>72</sup> LIVE, the UK sector’s representative body, has called for the Government to prioritise touring artists under the Reset, and to explore with the EU practical solutions to remove the existing barriers.<sup>73</sup>

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67 Cabinet Office, Department for Culture, Media, and Sport, [Young people from all backgrounds to get opportunity to study abroad as UK-EU deal unlocks Erasmus+](#), gov.uk, 17 December 2025

68 ADS Group ([EUT0042](#))

69 LIVE ([EUT0010](#))

70 Cabinet Office, [UK-EU Summit – Common Understanding](#), gov.uk, updated 22 December 2025

71 LIVE ([EUT0010](#))

72 Department for Business and Trade, [The UK’s Modern Industrial Strategy 2025](#), gov.uk, updated 9 April 2026

73 LIVE ([EUT0010](#))

**41. CONCLUSION**

We are concerned that, despite the Government’s stated commitment to support touring artists, the Reset has yet to deliver any meaningful improvements for a sector that plays a key role in driving UK growth.

**42. RECOMMENDATION**

We recommend that the Government uses the Reset to urgently prioritise improved mobility and visa arrangements for touring artists, moving beyond commitments to further dialogue, and delivers practical, measurable outcomes that support the UK’s creative industries.

*8. Business Mobility (No Progress)*

**43.** The UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement has limited provisions on the movement of people. UK nationals can travel to the EU visa free for up to 90 days in any 180-day period, including for some business reasons, though specific EU Member State reservations apply, reflecting national immigration and work permit requirements.<sup>74</sup> UK Finance told us this creates a complex patchwork that UK business travellers must navigate,<sup>75</sup> and, according to the British Chambers of Commerce, causes problems for services delivery abroad.<sup>76</sup> The Common Understanding set out that both sides would set up dedicated dialogues “as regards entry and temporary stay” for business travellers to reduce these barriers.<sup>77</sup> In parallel, the EU is also seeking changes to the UK’s visa sponsorship scheme for business travellers.

**44.** There is no evidence to date of substantive progress being made under the Reset. A first meeting of the UK-EU dialogue on business mobility established under the Common Understanding, is expected in the second quarter of 2026.<sup>78</sup>

**45. CONCLUSION**

We welcome the commitments made in the Common Understanding to seek improved business mobility arrangements. However, we note that progress on this issue is unlikely until after the planned UK-EU dialogues in the second quarter of this year. This is far too slow.

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74 UK Finance ([EUT0024](#))

75 UK Finance ([EUT0024](#))

76 British Chambers of Commerce ([EUT0047](#))

77 Cabinet Office, [UK-EU Summit – Common Understanding](#), gov.uk, updated 22 December 2025

78 Foreign Affairs Committee, First Special Report of Session 2024–26, [From a Common Understanding to Common Ground: Building a UK-EU Strategic Partnership fit for the future: Government Response](#), HC 108, page 16

**46. RECOMMENDATION**

Commitments to continued dialogue without defined objectives and timelines are inadequate. We recommend that the Government clearly identifies the priority services sectors for improved business mobility and sets out, in precise terms, the specific outcomes it is seeking from the EU. The Government should also define clear timelines for their delivery.

*9. Mutual Recognition of Professional Qualifications (MRPQ)  
(No Progress)*

- 47.** Since the UK left the EU’s single market, professional qualifications are no longer automatically mutually recognised in UK and EU markets. This limits UK/EU regulated professionals such as lawyers and accountants from delivering their services cross-border.<sup>79</sup> This friction is compounded by the current Trade and Cooperation Agreement’s conditions on business mobility (see above), which limit the duration and type of work professionals can conduct abroad.<sup>80</sup>
- 48.** The Common Understanding referenced shared “commitments” to further dialogues on mutual recognition, though the UK and EU will continue to use the existing TCA structures and mechanisms, rather than negotiating an improved process.<sup>81</sup> Evidence suggests that these have so far delivered no meaningful outcomes since the agreement entered into force in 2021.<sup>82</sup> To date, there has been no formal mutual UK-EU recognition of professional qualifications for any sector.<sup>83</sup>
- 49.** The Law Society told us the UK-Switzerland mutual recognition of qualifications agreement was a suitable precedent to explore under the Reset.<sup>84</sup> Yet, Sean McGuire, Director Europe and International, at the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), told us in January 2026 that the EU was “lukewarm” on MRPQ deals, and the likely cause of slow progress.<sup>85</sup> A first meeting of the UK-EU dialogue on professional qualifications, established under the Common Understanding, is expected in the second quarter of 2026.<sup>86</sup>

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79 UK in a Changing Europe, [Agreement on Mutual Recognition of Professional Qualifications \(MRPQs\)](#), 16 September 2024

80 British Chambers of Commerce ([EUT0047](#))

81 Cabinet Office, [UK-EU Summit – Common Understanding](#), gov.uk, updated 22 December 2025

82 ABTA ([EUT0017](#))

83 The Law Society ([EUT0021](#))

84 The Law Society ([EUT0021](#))

85 Oral evidence taken on 13 January 2026, [Q246](#), [Sean McGuire]

86 Foreign Affairs Committee, First Special Report of Session 2024–26, [From a Common Understanding to Common Ground: Building a UK-EU Strategic Partnership fit for the future: Government Response](#), HC 108, page 16

50. The Minister for Trade told the Committee in March 2026 that the UK was currently working on MRPQ arrangements for a series of sectors on a bilateral basis with individual Member States, including for the recognition of UK accountants in Spain and “specific work” in Germany.<sup>87</sup> The EU Commission, however, is reportedly against bilateral Member State deals, given the risk of fragmentation of EU Member State access to the UK market.<sup>88</sup>

51. **CONCLUSION**

We welcome the commitments from the Government to seek improved outcomes on the Mutual Recognition of Professional Qualifications (MRPQ) arrangements. The existing Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) framework is clearly unfit for this purpose, having delivered no real benefits since the agreement took effect in 2021. The Summit outcomes however lacked sufficient ambition and precision.

52. **RECOMMENDATION**

We recommend that the Government pursue an alternative route, outside the TCA, to secure EU-wide Mutual Recognition of Professional Qualifications (MRPQ) agreements and prioritise concluding these deals at pace. We ask that the Government set out whether the UK-Switzerland MRPQ Agreement could serve as a practical template for their delivery.

## The Security and Defence Partnership

53. The Security and Defence Partnership created a bespoke framework for cooperation on European defence and security issues and to grow stronger in the face of an “increasingly challenging security environment”.<sup>89</sup> It allows both sides to coordinate on defence readiness, and other areas like counterterrorism, maritime security and regional security.<sup>90</sup>

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87 Oral evidence taken on 9 March 2026, [Q409](#), [Sir Chris Bryant MP]

88 UK in a Changing Europe, [Agreement on Mutual Recognition of Professional Qualifications \(MRPQs\)](#), 16 September 2024

89 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and Ministry of Defence, [Security and defence partnership between the European Union and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland](#), gov.uk, 19 May 2025

90 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and Ministry of Defence, [Security and defence partnership between the European Union and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland](#), gov.uk, 19 May 2025

54. The partnership however contains no meaningful commitments to any specific actions, timelines or deliverables.<sup>91</sup> Significant concerns also include:
- a. The lack of a joint defence industrial strategy;
  - b. The absence of cooperation on economic and supply chain security; and
  - c. The absence of coordination to combat unfair behaviour by non-market economies.
55. It is therefore unclear exactly what the partnership will deliver. The ADS Group, which represents the UK's defence industry, noted the limited impact to date from the SDP, and lack of a coherent pathway in place for its implementation beyond existing high-level commitments.<sup>92</sup>

56. **CONCLUSION**

We welcome the concept of a Security and Defence Partnership to establish a bespoke framework for shared security and defence. The Committee is concerned, however, that it contains no meaningful commitments to specific action or a reporting mechanism through which to judge progress. Significant omissions include a joint defence industrial strategy, coordination against bad behaviour by non-market states, and work to improve economic and supply chain security.

## The Three Priority Agreements

57. At the May 2025 summit, both sides also concluded three sector-specific agreements to address priority issues. These agreements, showed that meaningful cooperation was achievable under the Reset:
- Fisheries: Both sides extended existing levels of access to each other's waters for 12 years, until June 2038.<sup>93</sup> This was a core EU demand, which the UK fishers did not widely welcome.<sup>94</sup>

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91 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Ministry of Defence, [Security and defence partnership between the European Union and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland](#), gov.uk, published 19 May 2025

92 ADS Group ([EUT0042](#))

93 European Commission, [New chapter in EU-UK relations announced at Leaders' Summit in London](#), 19 May 2025

94 Written evidence received for the Committee's inquiry into UK trade with the US, India, and EU, Institute of Directors ([UKT0032](#)), HC 996, August 2025

The UK Trade Policy Observatory believes it will not materially impact the UK economy,<sup>95</sup> though crucial to many coastal communities across the UK.

- Energy: The Trade and Cooperation Agreement's (TCA) energy trading provisions, which would otherwise have expired in June 2026, were extended on a continuous annual basis, to enable continued energy cooperation.<sup>96</sup>
- Steel: The EU agreed to temporarily reinstate tariff-free import quotas to historic<sup>97</sup> levels for imports of "Category 17"<sup>98</sup> products from the UK. The Government estimates this could save UK steel exporters £25 million in tariff costs annually.<sup>99</sup> These benefits may not materialise, however, because the new EU steel tariffs will take effect from 1 July 2026.

## ***Steel Trade and Addressing Global Overcapacity (In Progress)***

58. The steel agreement reached at the May 2025 summit showed both sides could cooperate to address shared overcapacity issues.<sup>100</sup> However, from 1 July 2026, the UK will overhaul its steel tariff import regime to protect domestic producers.<sup>101</sup> The EU will introduce similar protections.<sup>102</sup> This creates a risk for UK steel stakeholders, because 78% of all UK steel

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95 Written evidence received for the Committee's inquiry into UK trade with the US, India, and EU, UK Trade Policy Observatory and Centre for Inclusive Trade Policy ([UKTO047](#)), HC 996, August 2025

96 European Union, [Joint Declaration 1/2025 of the EU and the UK in the Partnership Council established by the Trade and Cooperation Agreement part](#), 19 June 2025

97 The historic quota levels are based on reference UK-EU trade volumes for a given, multi-year period, before the EU raised its tariffs on these products in March 2025.

98 Category 17 is a trade classification label, used for the purposes of import/export controls on specific steel products to provide clarity for businesses. They are not internationally harmonised, meaning different jurisdictions can include different products within the "same" category.

99 Prime Minister's Office, Cabinet Office and Department for Business and Trade, [PM secures new agreement with EU to benefit British people](#), gov.uk, 19 May 2025

100 European Commission, [Questions and answers on the package agreed at EU-United Kingdom Summit](#), 19 May 2025

101 Department for Business and Trade, [The UK Steel Strategy](#), gov.uk, updated 20 March 2026

102 Council of the European Union, [Council and European Parliament strike deal to protect EU's steel industry from global overcapacity](#), 13 April 2026

exports go to the EU.<sup>103</sup> There is no clarity on the impact of new EU measures for the UK. The EU has simply noted that Reset summit agreement would be “duly reflected” in the post-July 2026 regime.<sup>104</sup>

59. Peter Brennan, Director of Trade and Economic Policy at UK Steel, told us that new EU tariffs would do “Nothing good” for the UK steel sector and would only cause further unnecessary damage.<sup>105</sup> In his view, the UK and EU faced a shared challenge in global overcapacity, and did not need to impose these measures on bilateral trade. In March 2026, the Minister for Trade told us that he and the Secretary of State for Business and Trade were engaged in discussions with the EU to reach a deal on steel.<sup>106</sup> At the time of writing, no agreement had been announced. As things stand both sides will therefore still apply new measures from 1 July 2026, risking additional costs in manufacturing, construction, and engineering as a result on both sides.<sup>107</sup>

60. **CONCLUSION**

The UK and the EU face shared challenges and risks to domestic steel production from global steel overcapacity. The Reset presents a clear opportunity for both sides to work together on addressing this issue, building upon the limited progress of the initial May 2025 summit’s steel agreements.

61. **RECOMMENDATION**

We recommend that the Government urgently seek to reach an agreement with the EU on steel tariffs before 1 July 2026 or as soon as possible thereafter, to minimise harm to domestic industries. We urge the Government to ensure UK country-specific import quotas with the EU are not further reduced and current UK market access levels are maintained.

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103 Oral evidence taken by the Business and Trade Committee, 13 January 2026, [Q204](#), [Peter Brennan]

104 European Commission, [Questions and answers on the package agreed at EU-United Kingdom Summit](#), 19 May 2025

105 Oral evidence taken on 13 January 2026, [Q204](#), [Peter Brennan]

106 Oral evidence taken on 9 March 2026, [Q364](#), [Sir Chris Bryant MP]

107 British Chambers of Commerce ([EUT0047](#))

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## 2 Building on the Foundations

62. The Committee’s 2025 report set out 21 recommendations for furthering relations between the UK and the EU. Of the 21 policy recommendations we made:
- four have been completed;
  - eleven are in progress; and
  - on six, no discernible progress has been made.

**Table 2: Summary of Reset progress made against the Committee’s 2025 policy recommendations, since the inaugural May 2025 summit.**

2025 BTC Recommendation Status	Number of Recommendations
Completed	4
In Progress	11
No Progress	6

63. Outside of the Reset, the UK and the EU have concluded two separate agreements:
- Gibraltar: The UK territory was not covered by the original UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement.<sup>108</sup> The deal therefore provides a long-term settlement by linking it to the EU Schengen Area and Customs Union.
  - Competition cooperation: A cooperation agreement between respective UK and EU competition authorities on issues such as anti-trust and mergers.<sup>109</sup> The agreement will help safeguard enforcement of competition laws in both markets.

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108 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, [Summary: Draft UK-EU Agreement in respect of Gibraltar](#) (accessible), gov.uk, 26 February 2026

109 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, International treaty [UK/EU: Agreement regarding Cooperation on the Application of their Respective Competition Laws \[MS No.4/2026\]](#), gov.uk, 15 April 2026

**Table 3: Overview of remaining BTC 2025 policy recommendations, not all of which were directly covered by the Reset, and their progress since the inaugural May 2025 Reset summit.**

	<b>2025 BTC EU Reset Recommendation</b>	<b>Progress Assessment</b>
1.	UK joined the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement	Completed (Outside of Reset)
2.	Multi-year Agreement on Fisheries	Completed (Sectoral agreement)
3.	Protection for Critical National Infrastructure	Completed (Security and Defence Partnership)
4.	Data protection and adequacy	Completed
5.	Scientific Research Cooperation	Partial Progress
6.	Minimise Trade Barriers with Northern Ireland	Partial Progress
7.	Promote Regulatory Convergence	Partial Progress
8.	Cooperation on Economic Crime and Law Enforcement	Partial Progress
9.	Financial Services	No Progress
10.	Mutual recognition of conformity assessment	No Progress
11.	Pan-Euro Mediterranean Accession	No Progress
12.	Customs Cooperation and easements	No Progress
13.	Cooperation against non-market economies.	No Progress

## *1. Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (Completed)*

- 64.** In 2025, we recommended that the Government should follow the EU and join the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA) to help uphold a functioning dispute resolution system while broader WTO reforms are negotiated. As part of its June 2025 Trade Strategy, the UK announced it was joining the MPIA.<sup>110</sup>

<sup>110</sup> Department for Business and Trade, [The UK's Trade Strategy](#), gov.uk, updated 25 July 2025

## *2. Multi-year Agreement on Fisheries (Completed)*

65. In 2025, we recommended that the Government aim to conclude a multi-year agreement on fisheries access. At the May 2025 summit, both sides extended the existing levels of access to each other’s waters for a further 12 years, until June 2038.<sup>111</sup>

## *3. Protection for Critical National Infrastructure (Completed)*

66. We recommended that any new security arrangements with the EU include an explicit recognition to protect Critical National Infrastructure (CNI). The Security and Defence Partnership contained several references to CNI, including a mechanism for “strategic consultations” on hybrid threats, including CNI protection and resilience.<sup>112</sup>

## *4. Data Protection and Adequacy (Completed)*

67. In our 2025 report, we recommended the Government monitor the EU’s Data Union Strategy, taking whatever steps are required to ensure a permanent data adequacy agreement is secured. The EU’s 2025 extension of its data adequacy decisions under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and Law Enforcement Directive until 2031 was widely welcomed;<sup>113</sup> however, we note that this is not a permanent UK settlement and it may lapse if it is not renewed.

## *5. Scientific Research Cooperation (Partial Progress)*

68. Horizon Europe (also known as the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation), is the EU’s main programme that funds research and innovation. It operates on a seven-year funding cycle, with the 9th Framework Programme (FP9), due to expire at the end of 2027. This will be replaced by FP10 which will run from 2028 to 2034.<sup>114</sup>

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111 European Commission, [New chapter in EU-UK relations announced at Leaders’ Summit in London](#), 19 May 2025

112 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Ministry of Defence, [Security and defence partnership between the European Union and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland](#), gov.uk, 19 May 2025

113 UK Finance ([EUT0024](#))

114 House of Commons Library, [Horizon Europe 2028–2034: What do we know so far?](#), 29 September 2025

- 69.** The UK reached agreement to associate to FP9 in 2024 but participation in FP10 is not automatic. The UK must agree with the EU to associate to the successor scheme.<sup>115</sup> In our 2025 report, we urged the Government to ensure the UK was included in the successor programme. The EU has not yet agreed on what FP10 will look like, though the UK has signalled its intention to participate.<sup>116</sup> Formal UK association is therefore likely to take place in 2027, at the earliest.
- 70.** In May 2026, the UK and the EU also agreed to open negotiations on UK participation in the €5 billion Scaleup Europe Fund,<sup>117</sup> an equity investment vehicle designed to support tech business scale-ups in the EU. UK participation will require an amendment to the Trade and Cooperation Agreement, as the fund is part of an EU programme the UK does not currently subscribe to.

## *6. Minimise Trade Barriers with Northern Ireland (Partial Progress)*

- 71.** Under the Windsor Framework, Northern Ireland (NI) effectively remains within the EU's single market for goods.<sup>118</sup> Goods moved from Great Britain (GB) to NI therefore face additional paperwork and customs checks, restricting their movement within the UK's internal market. We recommended that the Government address these barriers.
- 72.** The Common Understanding reiterated a shared commitment to the Windsor Framework and its effective implementation.<sup>119</sup> The Government has also emphasised the benefits of an SPS Agreement on reducing barriers, alongside the ETS deal. However, other post-Brexit trade barriers between NI and GB, such as those attributable to product regulatory divergence, will remain while the UK is outside the EU Customs Union and Single Market.

## *7. Promote Regulatory Convergence (Partial Progress)*

- 73.** We recommended that the Government maximise compatible regulations with the EU and commit to the publication of a regulatory roadmap to guide its approach. This has been partially achieved via UK dynamic alignment

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115 House of Commons Library, [Horizon Europe 2028–2034: What do we know so far?](#), 29 September 2025

116 Department for Science, Innovation, & Technology, [UK position on EU's Research and Innovation Framework Programme](#), gov.uk, 26 September 2024

117 European Innovation Council, [Scaleup Europe Fund](#), (accessed 9 June 2026)

118 Prime Minister's Office, 10 Downing Street, [The Windsor Framework; a new way forward](#), gov.uk, updated 17 May 2024

119 Cabinet Office, [UK-EU Summit – Common Understanding](#), gov.uk, updated 22 December 2025

with EU regulation under the ETS, SPS, and electricity trading deals. There is not yet a regulatory roadmap; however, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and Prime Minister have both expressed clear desire for deeper single market integration. The Chancellor also set out, in March 2026, the principles which would guide the UK's approach to regulatory alignment.<sup>120</sup>

## 8. Cooperation on Economic Crime and Law Enforcement (Partial Progress)

74. The Common Understanding identifies several areas for potentially deepening law enforcement cooperation, including the exchange of data and evidence in criminal proceedings. It is unclear what, if anything, has been delivered on this since the Common Understanding was agreed. The UK and EU are discussing improved cooperation through exchanges of electronic evidence and of criminal record data.<sup>121</sup>

## 9. Financial Services (No Progress)

75. The UK-EU TCA largely focuses on goods and does little to address the barriers faced to trade in financial services.<sup>122</sup> In our 2025 report, we recommended that the UK and EU use the Financial Regulatory Forum to advance regulatory cooperation. The fifth meeting of the Forum was held in March 2026. As it is not a negotiating body, it reaffirmed both sides' commitment to continued cooperation but did not explicitly set out how cooperation will be enhanced.<sup>123</sup> Stakeholders, like UK Finance, told us that Financial Services have yet to be fully integrated into the Reset agenda, which means that many of the structural issues faced by the industry remain.<sup>124</sup> While opposed to dynamic alignment, UK Finance called for the next phase of Reset discussions to include financial services, and to seek to increase the existing levels of technical cooperation.<sup>125</sup>

## 10. Mutual Recognition of Conformity Assessment (No Progress)

76. We recommended the Government agree a Mutual Recognition Agreement on conformity assessment with the EU. This would allow UK-based bodies to assess whether UK-made products meet the EU's standards. At present, this

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120 HM Treasury, [Mais Lecture 2026](#), gov.uk, 17 March 2026

121 Council of the European Union, documents [6883/26](#) and [6884/26](#)

122 UK Finance ([EUT0024](#))

123 HM Treasury, [Joint UK-EU Financial Regulatory Forum - March 2026](#), gov.uk, 12 March 2026

124 UK Finance ([EUT0024](#))

125 UK Finance ([EUT0024](#))

can only be conducted by EU-based bodies, which adds further complexity, cost, and burden to trade.<sup>126</sup> Academics at the UK in a Changing Europe told the Committee in written evidence that this was the single most impactful agreement the UK could agree to improve bilateral trade.<sup>127</sup> It was rejected however by the EU Commission in the run-up to the 2025 summit. There are no signs this position has been reconsidered by either side. The UK in a Changing Europe also believes that the EU sees little benefit from these agreements with the UK.<sup>128</sup>

## 11. Pan-Euro Mediterranean Convention (No Progress)

77. The Pan-Euro Mediterranean (PEM) Convention is multilateral agreement between 25 contracting parties, including the EU, to harmonise rules of origin requirements in their respective trade deals.<sup>129</sup> This allows traders to source parts and components across contracting members, supporting supply chain diversification. We recommended that the UK consult with industry on the benefits of joining PEM. The Government's consultation on the possibility of joining concluded in December 2025 though it is still unclear whether the UK will seek to join.<sup>130</sup> Some UK stakeholders, like the British Chambers of Commerce, told the Committee it would benefit the UK to join,<sup>131</sup> though the EU is reportedly against UK accession.<sup>132</sup> If the UK were to join PEM, the existing UK-EU TCA rules of origin chapter would need to be amended, which the EU could refuse to do.

## 12. Customs Cooperation and Easements (No Progress)

78. We recommended the UK and EU should maximise the existing TCA customs cooperation provisions to cut red tape at the border. The Common Understanding contained no explicit reference to further customs easements. There is no evidence that existing provisions have

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126 British Standards Institution ([EUT0041](#))

127 UK in a Changing Europe ([EUT0023](#))

128 UK in a Changing Europe ([EUT0023](#))

129 Department for Business and Trade, call for evidence outcome, [Pan-Euro Mediterranean Convention on Rules of Origin \(PEM\): call for evidence](#), gov.uk, updated 26 March 2026

130 Letter from the Minister of State for Trade relating to the Department's response to the call for evidence on UK accession to the regional convention of Pan-Euro Mediterranean preferential rules of origin (PEM), [26 March 2026](#)

131 British Chambers of Commerce ([EUT0047](#))

132 Financial Times, [EU blocks Britain's attempts to join pan-European trading bloc](#), July 2, 2025

been used, such as deepened cooperation on trusted trader schemes, or any agreement to remove the requirements to make Safety and Security (S&S) declarations to move goods.<sup>133</sup>

- 79.** The British Chambers of Commerce told us both sides should agree to S&S removal, by an agreement based on existing EU-Switzerland arrangements.<sup>134</sup> On a visit to the Port of Dover, they told the Committee that significant economic gains could be achieved by improving UK-EU customs and operational data sharing, establishing clearer cross-government coordination structures on UK-EU border policies, and developing more interoperable digital border systems with European partners.<sup>135</sup>

### *13. Cooperation against non-market economies (No progress)*

- 80.** Last year, we recommended that the UK and EU look to coordinate actions against non-market economies and enhance cooperation on areas like trade defence. The summit contained no commitments to specific actions or commitments on these issues. However, the Security and Defence Partnership noted both sides would look to exchange views on external aspects of economic security, and continued cooperation in multilateral fora, like the G7.<sup>136</sup> The British Chambers of Commerce, in its evidence to the inquiry, called for the UK to develop a binding economic security agreement with the EU, to sit alongside the Trade and Cooperation Agreement.<sup>137</sup>
- 81.** The EU is also preparing potential legislation for an “Overcapacity Instrument”, designed to give the bloc additional tools to deal with imports of subsidised goods in strategic sectors.<sup>138</sup> This could impact UK businesses, particularly if Chinese products are diverted to the UK market because of EU measures.

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133 S&S declarations are additional pieces of customs documentation required for all movements of goods in and out of the UK. The EU operates a similar scheme, meaning traders often must complete and submit multiple additional documents to move goods across borders

134 British Chambers of Commerce ([EUT0047](#))

135 Port of Dover (Dover Harbour Board) ([EUT0039](#))

136 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and Ministry of Defence, [Security and defence partnership between the European Union and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland](#), 19 May 2025

137 British Chambers of Commerce ([EUT0047](#))

138 Politico, [EU Commission plans new squeeze on Chinese trade](#), 15 May 2026

82. The UK also continues to engage with the EU on its draft Industrial Accelerator Act (IAA), which aims to amend EU public procurement preferences to favour products “Made in the EU”.<sup>139</sup> This could disadvantage UK producers and exclude them from EU supply chains. The UK’s Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders has said the current draft IAA proposal “represents the greatest threat to a successful reset in UK-EU relations”.<sup>140</sup>

83. **RECOMMENDATION**

We are disappointed by the limited progress the Government has made against several of the Committee’s previous recommendations. We ask that the Government, in further discussions with the EU, re-double its efforts to secure meaningful improvements for the UK.

84. **CONCLUSION**

The current pace and ambition of the Reset is insufficient to address the challenges faced by both sides. Without a firm UK strategy and meaningful commitments, the Reset increasingly risks being blown off course by other global events. The 2026 Leader’s Summit should act as a critical moment for both sides to dramatically increase the levels of both shared ambition and pace.

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139 European Commission, [COM\(2026\)100 - Proposal for a Regulation on establishing a framework of measures for accelerating industrial capacity and decarbonisation in strategic sectors \(Industrial Accelerator Act\)](#), 4 March 2026

140 The Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders ([EUT0053](#))

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## 3 Time to Reset the Reset?

- 85.** The economic impact of Brexit is hotly contested. The Office for Budget Responsibility estimates the Brexit has cost the UK around 4% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).<sup>141</sup> Analysis from the National Bureau of Economic Research however puts the cost higher; at the start of 2025, the UK economy was 8% smaller than if it had remained in the EU.<sup>142</sup> Both indicate that Brexit has negatively impacted the UK's economy.
- 86.** Since leaving the EU, the UK has executed an independent trade policy. It has signed several new trade agreements, quickly becoming one of the most economically integrated non-regional partners in the Indo-Pacific. However, the UK's completed post-Brexit trade deals are only expected to increase the UK's GDP by a cumulative 0.5% by around 2040, based on UK Government modelling.<sup>143</sup>
- 87.** Stakeholder reaction to the 2025 Leaders' Summit and the Common Understanding has been mixed. It was viewed largely as a "negotiating agenda", that lacked detail and was largely goods focused,<sup>144</sup> with potential benefits contingent on further delivery.<sup>145</sup>
- a.** In January 2026, Paul Nowak, General Secretary of the Trades Union Congress (TUC), said that the Reset started to put things right but "we are still not in a place where the British public would want to be".<sup>146</sup> He went on to say that a lot had changed since the Reset's inception, and in the current global context, a stronger relationship with Europe was needed.<sup>147</sup> The economic benefits of a stronger relationship, compared to other UK trade deals, were in the TUC's view, of a completely different scale.<sup>148</sup>

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141 Office for Budget Responsibility, [Brexit Analysis](#), (accessed 16 March 2026)

142 National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series, NBER Working Paper No.34459, [The Economic Impact of Brexit](#), November 2025

143 The estimated UK GDP impacts are taken from the UK Government's own analysis of the benefits from each new or upgraded trade deal, published at the conclusion of negotiations. These GDP estimates and projections are subject to some uncertainty.

144 TheCityUK ([EUT0055](#))

145 Written evidence received for the Committee's inquiry into UK trade with the US, India, and EU, UK Trade Policy Observatory and Centre for Inclusive Trade Policy ([UKT0047](#)), HC 996, August 2025

146 Oral evidence taken on 13 January 2026, [Q234](#), [Paul Nowak]

147 Oral evidence taken on 13 January 2026, [Q238](#), [Paul Nowak]

148 Oral evidence taken on 13 January 2026, [Q249](#), [Paul Nowak]

- b. The Confederation of British Industry told the Committee that being outside the EU had given the UK some negotiating advantages, as evidenced by a lower United States tariff rate on UK exports when compared to the EU.<sup>149</sup>
- c. The UK in a Changing Europe told us that in an optimistic scenario, based on the existing commitments made, the Reset could add 0.5% to UK GDP by 2040,<sup>150</sup> which is significantly less than the purported 4-8% UK GDP reduction from Brexit.

88. The joint recommendation issued following the 7th UK-EU Parliamentary Partnership Assembly in March this year, urged both sides to raise the Reset’s level of ambition, which “will require flexibility from both sides”, to meet the scale of the current global challenges.<sup>151</sup>

**Table 4: Overview of completed new or upgraded UK post-Brexit trade deals, and their expected impacts on the UK’s economy.**

Completed UK Post-Brexit Free Trade Agreement	Estimated Change in UK GDP (£’s)	Estimated Change in UK GDP (%)
UK-India	+£4.8 billion	+0.13%
UK-Gulf Cooperation Council	+£3.7 billion	+0.10%
UK-Australia	+£2.3 billion	+0.08%
Accession to Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement on Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).	+£2 billion	0.09%
UK-Japan	+£1.5 billion	+0.07%
UK-New Zealand	+£0.8 billion	+0.03%
Estimated FTA Totals	+£15.1 billion	+0.50%
OBR’s Estimated UK GDP Reduction from Brexit		-4.0%

149 Oral evidence taken on 13 January 2026, [Q248](#), [Sean McGuire]

150 UK in a Changing Europe ([EUT0023](#))

151 The European Parliament, 7th EU-UK Parliamentary Partnership Assembly on 16-17 March 2026, [Recommendation on Strengthening the EU-UK Strategic Partnership](#)

NOTES:

1) GDP figures are all taken from UK Government analysis, where available, typically published at the conclusion of negotiations and/or in respective impact assessments.

2) The table does not include trade deals which the UK “rolled over” from when it left the EU. While not insignificant, these rollover agreements largely provided continuity, rather than expand UK market access opportunities.

3) Ongoing UK negotiations, like those with Turkey and Switzerland, are not included.

4) The table does not include the UK-South Korea upgraded trade deal, which concluded in December 2025, as the Government has yet to publish the necessary details.


5) The OBR’s estimated UK GDP reduction from Brexit has been included for a comparison.

- 89.** Over the remainder of this Parliament, debate about the UK’s relationship with the EU beyond the Reset will intensify. In March 2026, the Foreign Affairs Committee recommended that the Government publish a White Paper, detailing its long-term approach to the EU relationship.<sup>152</sup> In this section, we support this debate by setting out what future models of EU integration could look like, to help shape the national debate on the future of the UK’s relationship with Europe. Some of the models we explore were considered during the original Brexit debates. All will likely require the Government to revisit some, if not all, of their existing EU Reset red lines. All will require new trade-offs.

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152 Foreign Affairs Committee, Third Report of Session 2024–26, [From a Common Understanding to Common Ground: Building a UK-EU Strategic Partnership fit for the future](#), HC 857, para 198

# Overview of Potential Alignment Models:




## Status Quo: Current UK Position


Completed UK Post-Brexit Free Trade Agreement	Estimated GDP Boost (£'s)	Estimated UK GDP Boost (%)
UK-India	+£4.8 billion	+0.13%
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UK-Australia	+£2.3 billion	+0.08%
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UK-Japan	+£1.5 billion	+0.07%
UK-New Zealand	+£0.8 billion	+0.03%
<b>Estimated FTA Totals</b>	<b>+£15.1 billion</b>	<b>+0.50%</b>
<i>OBR's Estimated UK GDP Reduction from Brexit</i>		<b>-4.0%</b>

Estimated UK Growth Impact


### UK-EU Customs Union: "Turkey Model"



### UK-EU Bilateral Deals: "Swiss Model"



### UK-EU Single Market: "Norway Model"



**Figure 1: Overview of current and possible UK-EU relationship models, their expected impact on UK economic growth compared with the current arrangement, and how closer integration may boost UK growth but involve trade-offs**

## **A UK-EU Customs Union/ “The Turkey Model”**

- 90.** The simplest advance on today’s relationship is a UK-EU Customs Union to remove some border frictions on goods trade.<sup>153</sup> This would entail the UK entering a relationship with the EU like Turkey. The key features are:
- a.** No freedom of movement;
  - b.** No financial contributions;
  - c.** All quantitative restrictions on goods trade, such as tariffs and import quotas, are eliminated. (While the current UK-EU TCA provides for zero-tariffs, zero-quota trade, exported goods must meet rules of origin requirements and have the necessary paperwork, which can cause significant delays);<sup>154</sup> and
  - d.** Rules of origin and the associated paperwork (which have significantly restricted trade in manufacturing sectors like transport equipment, and machinery), would no longer apply.<sup>155</sup>
- 91.** The key limitations are that Customs Unions:
- a.** Only cover trade in goods (and not necessarily all, unless explicitly agreed to via negotiations);<sup>156</sup>
  - b.** Would not reduce barriers to trade in services (the bulk of the UK’s economy) as these are outside the scope of tariffs;<sup>157</sup>
  - c.** Would not address issues of product regulatory divergence (a non-tariff barrier). Border friction would remain to ensure goods meet the EU’s single market requirements;<sup>158</sup>

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153 UK Trade Policy Observatory, University of Sussex ([EUT0056](#))

154 British Chambers of Commerce ([EUT0047](#))

155 UK in a Changing Europe ([EUT0023](#))

156 The [EU-Turkey Custom Union](#) covers most industrial products and some processed agricultural goods. Tariffs and some trade restrictions remain on coal, steel, and agricultural goods, which are not in scope of the customs union.

157 UK Trade Policy Observatory, University of Sussex ([EUT0056](#))

158 UK Trade Policy Observatory, University of Sussex ([EUT0056](#))

- d. Removes the UK's control over its own tariff rates and limits an independent trade policy. A common external tariff (the same as the EU's) is applied to all imports from other countries. If the EU signed a new trade deal, the UK would need to lower its tariffs on imports from that country but would not automatically get reduced tariffs on its exports in return;<sup>159</sup> and
  - e. Require renegotiation of the UK's core post-Brexit trade agreements like India, the Gulf Cooperation Council, Australia, New Zealand, and CPTPP accession, to match the EU's tariff rates with these partners.<sup>160</sup>
92. Paul Nowak, General Secretary of the TUC, told us in oral evidence that while the TUC favoured the closest possible UK relationship with Europe: "I am not wedded, and the TUC certainly is not wedded, to things like a customs union".<sup>161</sup> Other stakeholders noted that a UK-EU customs union, whilst removing some trade barriers, would constrain the UK's independent trade policy, its ability to negotiate valuable concessions with other trade partners, and do very little to improve services, data, and digital trade.<sup>162</sup>

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159 UK in a Changing Europe ([EUT0023](#))

160 UK in a Changing Europe ([EUT0023](#))

161 Oral evidence taken on 13 January 2026, [Q238](#), [Paul Nowak]

162 The Competere Foundation ([EUT0044](#)), Make UK ([EUT0050](#))

## Model Coverage:

Core Metrics	Impacted by Model?
Trade in Goods	Yes
Trade in Services	No
Regulatory Alignment	Limited
Single Market Integration	No




### UK-EU Customs Union: "Turkey Model"

Estimated UK Growth Impact










Low

## Other Considerations:



## UK-EU Trade & Wider Policy Implications:

Advantages	Drawbacks
 <p>Covers goods (only) and removes tariffs and quantitative restrictions for sectors in scope.</p>	 <p>Does not cover services trade, the bulk of the UK's economy.</p>
 <p>Eliminates complex rules of origin and associated customs paperwork for goods in scope.</p>	 <p>UK post-Brexit FTAs, like India, to be renegotiated, and all UK global tariffs, to match EU-applied rates.</p>
 <p>Would support some small businesses in re-trading with the EU.</p>	 <p>Future UK trade policy independence restricted. UK could not sign deals which reduced its tariffs.</p>
	 <p>Does not address regulatory divergence as UK would remain outside EU single market.</p>

**Figure 2: Overview of the key features of a potential UK-EU customs union, where barriers to goods trade are reduced but services see little change. The UK’s ability to sign independent trade deals, which reduced UK tariffs, would be limited.**

## A Return to the Single Market?

- 93.** Outside a UK-EU Customs Union, there are two basic options for aligning more deeply with the EU’s Single Market:
- a.** A bilateral deal like the Swiss model;
  - b.** Joining an EU-connected trade group such as the European Free Trade Association (EFTA)/ the European Economic Area (EEA), like the Norwegian model.
- 94.** EFTA is an intergovernmental organisation consisting of Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein. It promotes trade and economic integration between the four states, the EU, and other global partners via the EFTA Convention, acting to reduce some trade barriers like that of a standard free trade agreement.
- 95.** The EEA Agreement with the EU is adjacent to the EFTA Convention, which extends the EU’s single market beyond the 27 EU Member States, to include Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, known as the EEA-EFTA states.
- 96.** Neither EFTA nor the EEA Agreements create a customs union. Members are therefore free to operate an independent trade policy, and sign trade deals which reduce or eliminate import tariffs. It is possible to be a member of the EFTA Convention but not a member of the EEA. This is the case for Switzerland.
- 97.** The virtue of these approaches is that they tackle post-Brexit regulatory divergence, which has created a complex patchwork of differing market requirements. The British Chambers of Commerce told us that exports of automotive, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and industrial products, had seen trade reductions from UK-EU regulatory divergence since 2021.<sup>163</sup> The CBI’s Sean McGuire told us the biggest barriers UK traders face are not “necessarily about tariffs” but regulations and a lack of UK-EU cooperation.<sup>164</sup>
- 98.** In her 17 March 2026 Mais Lecture, the Chancellor of the Exchequer appeared to suggest this was the direction of Government travel. She emphasised the “strategic imperative” of deeper regulatory

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163 British Chambers of Commerce ([EUT0047](#))

164 Oral evidence taken on 13 January 2026, [Q237](#), [Sean McGuire]

alignment with the EU, suggesting the UK could abide by EU regulations either via negotiations, like the SPS and ETS deals, or unilaterally.<sup>165</sup> The principles which the Chancellor set out to guide UK's approach to alignment were:

- a.** It would mean higher growth and investment, more jobs and consumer benefits for the long term;
  - b.** The future direction of policy is sufficiently stable and compatible in terms of values and objectives; and
  - c.** The UK's economic and national security and resilience would be preserved or enhanced.<sup>166</sup>
- 99.** This framework is useful, particularly given that there are mixed views amongst stakeholders as to how regulatory divergence is best addressed or what sectors should be prioritised:
- a.** The CBI told us that “We would not nail our colours to a single market or customs union just yet, but dynamic alignment and alignment, where it is in the economic interest of the UK, makes sense”.<sup>167</sup> In their view, alignment was likely to benefit goods trade the most, rather than in services and new industries like Artificial Intelligence, where the UK can retain a competitive advantage.<sup>168</sup>
  - b.** TheCityUK told us that “For financial and related professional services (FRPS), it would not be appropriate to institute a system of automatic dynamic alignment”.<sup>169</sup> They went on to say that “meaningful improvements do not need to depend on alignment”, and that the priority should be to strengthen cooperation within the existing UK-EU frameworks.<sup>170</sup>
- 100.** In the King's Speech on 13 May 2026, the Government set out its plans for a European Partnership Bill, granting the necessary powers to align with EU regulations and support the proposed SPS and ETS deals, potentially extending to new sectors in future.<sup>171</sup>

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165 HM Treasury, [Mais Lecture 2026](#), gov.uk, 17 March 2026

166 HM Treasury, [Mais Lecture 2026](#), gov.uk, 17 March 2026

167 Oral evidence taken on 13 January 2026, [Q248](#), [Sean McGuire]

168 Oral evidence taken on 13 January 2026, [Q249](#), [Sean McGuire]

169 TheCityUK ([EUT0055](#))

170 TheCityUK ([EUT0055](#))

171 Prime Minister's Office, 10 Downing Street, [King's Speech 2026: background briefing notes](#), gov.uk, updated 28 May 2026

- 101.** UK-EU regulatory divergence could be reduced if the UK were to seek a relationship with the EU like that of Norway and Switzerland. Both are more integrated with the EU’s single market than the UK via bespoke arrangements. However, under both the Swiss and Norway models, the UK would be required:
- a.** To contribute financially towards the economic development of the EU’s lower-income Member States.<sup>172, 173</sup> In evidence to the House of Lords European Affairs Committee on 14 April 2026, the Swiss Ambassador to the UK said “I would think that if you want to have access to the common market, you will need to pay some cohesion money”.<sup>174</sup>
  - b.** To accept some increased freedom of movement of people in return for greater single market access.
- 102.** The UK has ruled out freedom of movement and a general contribution towards the EU’s general budget of this kind.<sup>175</sup> It has, however, agreed to some limited payments under the ETS and SPS deals to cover incurred EU administrative costs.<sup>176</sup> The EU’s negotiating mandate on electricity trading for example states it will establish a permanent mechanism for UK contributions towards its cohesion objectives.<sup>177</sup> Switzerland does not pay its cohesion contributions to the EU, instead, it partners with Member States in receipt to support their use of the funds.<sup>178</sup> The UK Government has not explicitly ruled out a Swiss-style mechanism for any cohesion payments that may be required.

## **The “Swiss Model”**

- 103.** Switzerland has negotiated partial access to the EU’s single market (and by association, the EEA-EFTA states) through a series of separate bilateral agreements negotiated over many years.<sup>179</sup> As part of its latest

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172 British Chambers of Commerce ([EUT0047](#))

173 The EU’s Cohesion Objectives aimed to reduce social and economic disparities across EU Member States. They provide financial support to states with gross national incomes per capita, that are below 90% the EU-27 average.

174 Oral evidence taken by the House of Lords European Affairs Committee on 14 April 2026, [Q16](#), [His Excellency Dominique Paravicini]

175 Oral evidence taken by the Lords European Affairs Committee on 1 July 2025, [Q184](#), [Nick Thomas-Symonds MP]

176 Oral evidence taken on 9 March 2026, [Q414](#), [Sir Chris Bryant MP]

177 European Council, [EU-UK relations: Council greenlights talks on electricity and cohesion deals, as well as UK’s participation in Erasmus+ for 2027](#), 30 March 2026.

178 Oral evidence taken by the House of Lords European Affairs Committee on 14th April 2026, [Q16](#), [His Excellency Dominique Paravicini]

179 Oral evidence taken by the House of Lords European Affairs Committee on 14th April 2026, [Q14](#), [His Excellency Dominique Paravicini]

package of agreements with the EU, Switzerland is planning to align with all EU single market legislation for industrial goods, agrifood, electricity trading, and air and land transport, via dynamic alignment.<sup>180</sup> However, by accepting EU legislation in these areas, it has effectively become a “rule-taker” from the EU, with no formal vote on whether new EU legislation is adopted, (it is granted decision-shaping rights, allowing it to participate in the preparation and discussion of new EU laws). It must also contribute financially towards EU cohesion objectives and accept some freedom of movement.<sup>181</sup>

**104.** The British Chambers of Commerce told us that the EU-Swiss agreements do contain “emergency brake” provisions regarding freedom of movement, though if used, come with a cost of reduced EU market access.<sup>182</sup>

**105.** The Swiss Model was cited as a more flexible approach towards EU integration than the Norway Model:

- a.** It could allow the UK and EU to create a range of single markets in defined sectors. Make UK recommended the UK pursue dynamic alignment and closer cooperation on a sector-by-sector basis, starting where the impact of regulatory divergence has been high.<sup>183</sup>
- b.** However, the Competere Foundation said that the Swiss model was a poor template for the UK, given it would limit the UK’s future regulatory flexibility in the aligned sectors, including for UK domestic policies (see section on the SPS agreement), and should therefore act as a “cautionary example of how sectoral access can become a route toward regulatory dependency”.<sup>184</sup>

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180 Switzerland’s European policy FDFA, [Content of the package Switzerland-EU \(Bilaterals III\)](#), 13 March 2026

181 UK in a Changing Europe ([EUT0023](#))

182 British Chambers of Commerce ([EUT0047](#))

183 Make UK ([EUT0050](#))

184 The Competere Foundation ([EUT0044](#))

## Model Coverage:

Core Metrics	Impacted by Model?
Trade in Goods	Yes
Trade in Services	Yes
Regulatory Alignment	Yes-some
Single Market Integration	Yes




### UK-EU Bilateral Deals: "Swiss Model"

Estimated UK Growth Impact



Low - Medium

## Other Considerations:



## UK-EU Trade & Wider Policy Implications:

Advantages	Drawbacks
<p>Partial single market-style access for both goods and services, reducing some post-Brexit trade barriers.</p>	<p>UK would become "rule-taker", with limited ability to influence, and no formal vote, over EU-led policy.</p>
<p>UK and EU could negotiate tailor-made sector-specific agreements, that are mutually beneficial for both sides.</p>	<p>UK regulatory flexibility, including for domestic policies, limited in all aligned sectors.</p>
<p>UK retains an independent trade policy, as it is not a customs union. Can sign deals which reduce tariffs.</p>	<p>Permanent UK administrative burden imposed to keep pace with changing EU legislation across all areas.</p>
	<p>Some customs bureaucracy and border frictions, including rules of origin, would remain.</p>

**Figure 3: Overview of the core elements of a “Swiss-style” UK relationship with the EU, that would reduce some trade barriers for both goods and services. The UK would benefit from greater access to the EU’s single market, though this would require UK financial contributions, freedom of movement, and offer limited UK influence over EU rules and policymaking.**

### **The “Norway Model”**

- 106.** Under the EEA agreement, Norway is fully integrated within the EU’s single market for goods, capital, services, and people.<sup>185</sup>
- 107.** However, as with the Swiss Model, Norway must.<sup>186</sup>
  - a.** dynamically align with all relevant single market legislation, with no formal vote on its adoption;
  - b.** contribute financially towards EU economic cohesion objectives; and
  - c.** accept full freedom of movement.
- 108.** The main benefit of such an approach is that it removes many trade barriers, particularly for services, which have limited coverage in the existing UK-EU TCA, by delivering deeper EU single market integration for the UK.
- 109.** Some stakeholders, however, cautioned against the loss of the UK’s regulatory sovereignty. UK Finance said that these effects would be felt most acutely during periods of substantial EU single market reforms.<sup>187</sup> The European Movement in Scotland said that becoming a “rule-taker” would be a significant drawback for an economy the size of the UK under the Norway model.<sup>188</sup> They went on to say that seeking to become an EEA-EFTA state was an unnecessary distraction, and that while it could deliver significant economic benefits, it would leave the UK with no significant influence in shaping future EU regulatory outcomes, and certainly much less than it had as a Member State.<sup>189</sup> This model has been described by the European Council on Foreign Relations as “integration without representation”.<sup>190</sup>

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185 UK in a Changing Europe ([EUT0023](#))

186 UK in a Changing Europe ([EUT0023](#))

187 UK Finance ([EUT0024](#))

188 European Movement in Scotland ([EUT0025](#))

189 European Movement in Scotland ([EUT0025](#))

190 European Council on Foreign Relations, [Lessons from the Norway-EU relationship](#), 21 June 2016

- 110.** There is no precedent for a country to join the EEA, without first joining either the EFTA Convention or the EU. While the UK could seek to join, there is no guarantee existing EFTA members would support accession.<sup>191</sup> Even if successful, accession to the EEA Agreement would still require the EU's consent.

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191 UK in a Changing Europe ([EUT0023](#))

## Model Coverage:

Core Metrics	Impacted by Model?
Trade in Goods	Yes
Trade in Services	Yes
Regulatory Alignment	Yes-full
Single Market Integration	Yes




### UK-EU Single Market: "Norway Model"

Estimated UK Growth Impact



Medium - High

## Other Considerations:



## UK-EU Trade & Wider Policy Implications:

Advantages	Drawbacks
<p>Complete single market access for both goods and services, reducing post-Brexit trade barriers.</p>	<p>UK would become "rule-taker", with limited ability to influence, and no formal vote, over EU-led policy.</p>
<p>UK retains an independent trade policy, as it is not a customs union. Can sign deals which reduce tariffs.</p>	<p>UK regulatory flexibility, including for domestic policies, limited in all aligned sectors.</p>
	<p>Permanent UK administrative burden imposed to keep pace with changing EU legislation across all areas.</p>
	<p>Some customs bureaucracy and border frictions, including rules of origin, would remain.</p>

**Figure 4: Overview of a “Norway-style” UK-EU relationship, which would reduce most barriers to trade in goods and services, effectively placing the UK back within the EU’s single market. As with the “Swiss-style” approach, this would require UK financial contributions, freedom of movement, and limited UK influence over EU rules and policymaking.**

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# Annex 1: Business and Trade Committee Recommendations & Progress Scorecard.<sup>192</sup>

BTC 2025 Pre-Summit Recommendation	Progress Assessment
Any new UK-EU security arrangements must include an explicit recognition that it would be mutually beneficial to act together to guard the critical national infrastructure on which the UK and EU business community depends, from those who wish it ill.	Completed
The UK and EU both support a stable free trading system. Like the EU, the UK Government should join the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA) to help uphold a functioning dispute resolution system while broader WTO reforms are negotiated.	Completed
We concur with the recommendation of the EU-UK Parliamentary Partnership Assembly that there would be value in “providing a signal at or before the [UK-EU] Summit that a fair deal on fisheries will be reached” and call on the Government to enable a multi-year settlement.	Completed
We note the extensive cooperation between the Government and the European Commission on the Data (Use and Access) Bill. We recommend that the Government monitors the EU’s Data Union Strategy upon its publication, assesses implications for UK policy, and take whatever steps are required to ensure a permanent data adequacy agreement is secured.	Completed

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<sup>192</sup> House of Commons Business and Trade Committee, Sixth Report of Session 2024–25, [How to strengthen UK-EU Relations: Policy Priorities for the Summit](#), HC908

BTC 2025 Pre-Summit Recommendation	Progress Assessment
<p>The UK Government should seek a new, deep UK-EU Security Pact, including a shared defence industrial strategy to ensure that Euro-NATO allies are procuring the best equipment and most potent capabilities—without regard to country of origin within our pool of allies—in the most efficient and rapid way.</p>	<p>In Progress</p>
<p>To support the fight against economic crime, we urge the Government to explore how to maximise opportunities to deepen law enforcement cooperation with the EU, in particular to secure real-time intelligence exchanges. We hope to see the announcement of a clear roadmap for further negotiations in this area at the forthcoming UK/EU summit.</p>	<p>In Progress</p>
<p>The Committee urges the Government to prioritise the minimisation of trade burdens in Northern Ireland as a fundamental element of any future UK-EU reset. This should be achieved through a strong emphasis on building trust between the Parties, maintaining clear and consistent communication with the Northern Irish business community and civil society, and ensuring Northern Ireland remains central to discussions on trade easements.</p>	<p>In Progress</p>
<p>We support the Government’s intention to negotiate a Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) agreement with the EU to reduce the need for regulatory formalities and controls at the border for agri-food products, plants and animals.</p>	<p>In Progress</p>
<p>We recommend that the Government consults with the business community, unions, workers and consumer groups and identifies sectors of the economy where, over the next ten years, there could be mutual gains from maximising compatible regulation with the EU. [ ... ] Where there is significant mutual gain from compatible regulation with the EU, the Government should commit to a regulatory roadmap that maintains compatible regulations with the EU.</p>	<p>In Progress</p>

BTC 2025 Pre-Summit Recommendation	Progress Assessment
<p>To achieve the shared strategic objectives of reducing carbon emissions, improving energy security, and expanding renewables, the UK and the EU must prioritise energy cooperation in upcoming discussions. There is a clear need to move beyond the current state of implementation of Trade and Cooperation Agreement’s current electricity trading provisions, which industry has deemed unfit for purpose. The Government should review industry proposals for improving market coupling arrangements and seek to agree the most efficient electricity trading framework possible.</p>	<p>In Progress</p>
<p>To prevent the UK and EU’s respective Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism schemes from becoming barriers to trade in electricity and carbon-intensive goods, when doing so maximises export potential and reduces consumer costs, the Government should seek to link, and keep aligned, the UK Emissions Trading Scheme with the EU Emissions Trading Scheme. The Government should ensure action is in place to mitigate any impacts while the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism is in place and the UK’s is not.</p>	<p>In Progress</p>
<p>To achieve the best outcomes in terms of innovation and in turn growth, we urge that the Government make the case for all elements of European Research Framework Programmes, including FP10, to be open to third-country participation, and urge the Government to engage with UK research communities to maximise UK participation.</p>	<p>In Progress</p>
<p>We recommend that the Government draws lessons from the slow pace of mutual professional qualification recognition negotiations to date, reassesses which mutual recognition agreements would contribute most to our mutual economic gain, and publishes a new roadmap of negotiating priorities for mutual recognition of qualifications.</p>	<p>In Progress</p>

BTC 2025 Pre-Summit Recommendation	Progress Assessment
<p>The UK and the EU should consider the development of an ambitious, visa-based youth mobility scheme with a limited number of participants. This initiative would allow young people to spend up to 12 months in the UK or EU for cultural and educational exchange, facilitating language acquisition, fostering a deeper understanding of shared European history and heritage, and enabling work and apprenticeship opportunities. Such an initiative would contribute to the long-term strengthening of trust and cooperation, which are essential foundations for international trade relations and mutual security.</p>	<p>In Progress</p>
<p>The Committee urges the Government to pursue these opportunities urgently and decisively, ensuring Britain and Europe remain globally competitive and strategically aligned.</p>	<p>In Progress</p>
<p>We recognise the importance of reducing barriers to trade for touring artists. Given the economic and cultural significance of these sectors, continued engagement between UK and EU regulatory bodies is necessary to facilitate smoother market access.</p>	<p>No Progress</p>
<p>[The Government] should also seek, where beneficial for both parties, mutual recognition of conformity assessments.</p>	<p>No Progress</p>
<p>The Government should consult with industry on rejoining the Regional Convention on Pan-Euro-Mediterranean Preferential Rules of Origin as an alternative to the rules of origin arrangements agreed in the Trade and Cooperation Agreement.</p>	<p>No Progress</p>
<p>The Government should seek to maximise cuts to the red tape currently restricting free trade with the EU, taking full advantage of the customs cooperation provisions in the Trade and Cooperation Agreement. Specifically, it should pursue mutual recognition of UK and EU Authorised Economic Operator schemes for customs simplification, a bilateral waiver of safety and security declarations, and enhanced cooperation to facilitate roll-on, roll-off cargo traffic.</p>	<p>No Progress</p>

BTC 2025 Pre-Summit Recommendation	Progress Assessment
<p>The UK should work closely with the EU to strengthen coordinated action against non-market economies that undermine the international trading system through unfair practices [ ... ]. Enhancing cooperation on trade defence instruments—such as anti-subsidy and anti-dumping measures—along with alignment of safeguards against use of forced labour in supply chains will help ensure a more effective and consistent response to market distortions that threaten fair competition.</p>	<p>No Progress</p>
<p>The Government should prioritise financial services in EU relations by using the EU-UK Financial Regulatory Forum to build on previous best practice and advance regulatory cooperation.</p>	<p>No Progress</p>

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# Conclusions and Recommendations

## A New Strategic Partnership

1. The Common Understanding is a significant positive step to improve UK-EU relations. Thirteen months on, however, an underwhelming amount of progress has been made. So far, the Reset has delivered limited meaningful impact. (Conclusion, Paragraph 9)
2. We recommend that Government act quickly to make more progress on the Reset. It must also ensure future such agreements are accompanied with clear policy workplans and milestones for delivering outcomes. (Recommendation, Paragraph 10)
3. Failure to secure UK participation in SAFE was a disappointing outcome. It should not preclude further defence cooperation between the UK and the EU. The Committee agrees that the cost of UK participation, if reported correctly, was too high. On that basis, we agree with the Government's decision not to participate at this stage. (Conclusion, Paragraph 15)
4. We recommend that the Government re-open negotiations on UK participation in future rounds of SAFE and prioritise inclusion in the EU's "Loan for Ukraine". In the interim, it must continue to pursue bilateral defence partnerships with EU Member States, building upon previous successes such as the Trinity House Agreement and explore the case for seeking a consolidation of the Multilateral Defence Mechanism and the Canadian-led Defence Security and Resilience Bank. We ask the Government to outline its plans for enhanced defence cooperation with Member States going forward. (Recommendation, Paragraph 16)
5. A Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) agreement with the EU is on balance in the UK's interest. It will help support increased trade in agricultural goods. However, greater transparency and guidance is needed on its potential impacts on affected businesses. Clarity is also required on the future implications of EU legislation for UK business under an SPS arrangement, particularly under dynamic alignment. Business decisions are being made now which risk falling foul of the deal's eventual requirements. (Conclusion, Paragraph 21)

6. We recommend that the Government commit to consult with businesses on SPS throughout the Reset. At the conclusion of its SPS negotiations with the EU, ministers must publish a detailed and comprehensive SPS agreement implementation plan. This plan should set out how it will provide support for businesses to ensure compliance with SPS requirements. (Recommendation, Paragraph 22)
7. We welcome the ambition to conclude talks on an Emissions Trading Scheme agreement by the time of the 2026 UK-EU summit. Linking UK-EU Emissions Trading Schemes will deliver mutual benefits to businesses. Mutual Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) waivers will also support trade in emission-intensive sectors and support joint progress towards environmental commitments and greenhouse gas reductions. (Conclusion, Paragraph 25)
8. We recommend that the Government move as quickly as possible to conclude the ETS linkage agreement. Once negotiations have concluded, it should seek provisional application of the agreement before its formal ratification. This would allow industry to feel its benefits, as soon as possible. (Recommendation, Paragraph 26)
9. The current electricity trading arrangements with the EU have caused market inefficiencies and increased UK energy costs. Reducing these costs through an agreement with the EU will provide significant benefits to UK businesses and consumers and support the broader UK and EU energy transitions towards renewables. (Conclusion, Paragraph 30)
10. The need for a UK-EU agreement on energy trading is clear. The current situation in Iran has compounded the need for a rapid agreement to be reached. We note that negotiations have been too slow to start and the timelines for completion are too long. (Conclusion, Paragraph 31)
11. We recommend that the Government prioritises negotiations on a UK-EU agreement on energy trading, with the aim of reaching an agreement as soon as possible. (Recommendation, Paragraph 32)
12. We note there are potential benefits for the UK from a Youth Experience Scheme with the EU, economically and culturally. We recognise however there is a mismatch between the UK and the EU ambitions. (Conclusion, Paragraph 35)
13. We therefore recommend the Government sets out the UK ambitions for the agreement on a Youth Experience Scheme. This should set out the overall numbers of participants allowed, the visa timeframes, visa requirements, and its position on access to home fee rates at UK universities. (Recommendation, Paragraph 36)

14. We welcome the UK re-joining the Erasmus+ scheme. To support transparency, we recommend that the Government set out the underlying data to support the UK's decision to rejoin, a full cost-benefit analysis of long-term membership of Erasmus+, and its view on continued UK association as part of the 2028–2034 budgetary cycle. (Recommendation, Paragraph 39)
15. We are concerned that, despite the Government's stated commitment to support touring artists, the Reset has yet to deliver any meaningful improvements for a sector that plays a key role in driving UK growth. (Conclusion, Paragraph 41)
16. We recommend that the Government uses the Reset to urgently prioritise improved mobility and visa arrangements for touring artists, moving beyond commitments to further dialogue, and delivers practical, measurable outcomes that support the UK's creative industries. (Recommendation, Paragraph 42)
17. We welcome the commitments made in the Common Understanding to seek improved business mobility arrangements. However, we note that progress on this issue is unlikely until after the planned UK-EU dialogues in the second quarter of this year. This is far too slow. (Conclusion, Paragraph 45)
18. Commitments to continued dialogue without defined objectives and timelines are inadequate. We recommend that the Government clearly identifies the priority services sectors for improved business mobility and sets out, in precise terms, the specific outcomes it is seeking from the EU. The Government should also define clear timelines for their delivery. (Recommendation, Paragraph 46)
19. We welcome the commitments from the Government to seek improved outcomes on the Mutual Recognition of Professional Qualifications (MRPQ) arrangements. The existing Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) framework is clearly unfit for this purpose, having delivered no real benefits since the agreement took effect in 2021. The Summit outcomes however lacked sufficient ambition and precision. (Conclusion, Paragraph 51)
20. We recommend that the Government pursue an alternative route, outside the TCA, to secure EU-wide Mutual Recognition of Professional Qualifications (MRPQ) agreements and prioritise concluding these deals at pace. We ask that the Government set out whether the UK-Switzerland MRPQ Agreement could serve as a practical template for their delivery. (Recommendation, Paragraph 52)
21. We welcome the concept of a Security and Defence Partnership to establish a bespoke framework for shared security and defence. The Committee is concerned, however, that it contains no meaningful

commitments to specific action or a reporting mechanism through which to judge progress. Significant omissions include a joint defence industrial strategy, coordination against bad behaviour by non-market states, and work to improve economic and supply chain security. (Conclusion, Paragraph 56)

- 22.** The UK and the EU face shared challenges and risks to domestic steel production from global steel overcapacity. The Reset presents a clear opportunity for both sides to work together on addressing this issue, building upon the limited progress of the initial May 2025 summit's steel agreements. (Conclusion, Paragraph 60)
- 23.** We recommend that the Government urgently seek to reach an agreement with the EU on steel tariffs before 1 July 2026 or as soon as possible thereafter, to minimise harm to domestic industries. We urge the Government to ensure UK country-specific import quotas with the EU are not further reduced and current UK market access levels are maintained. (Recommendation, Paragraph 61)

## **Building on the Foundations**

- 24.** We are disappointed by the limited progress the Government has made against several of the Committee's previous recommendations. We ask that the Government, in further discussions with the EU, re-double its efforts to secure meaningful improvements for the UK. (Recommendation, Paragraph 83)
- 25.** The current pace and ambition of the reset is insufficient to address the challenges faced by both sides. Without a firm UK strategy and meaningful commitments, the reset increasingly risks being blown off course by other global events. The 2026 Leader's Summit should act as a critical moment for both sides to dramatically increase the levels of both shared ambition and pace. (Conclusion, Paragraph 84)

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# Formal minutes

**Tuesday 16 June 2026**

## Members present:

Liam Byrne, in the Chair

Dan Aldridge

Antonia Bance

Sarah Edwards

Leigh Ingham

## UK-EU relations a decade on

Draft Report (*UK-EU relations a decade on*), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.

*Ordered*, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 110, read and agreed to.

Annex and Summary agreed to.

*Resolved*, That the Report be the Fourth Report of the Committee to the House.

*Ordered*, That the Chair make the Report to the House.

*Ordered*, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the provisions of Standing Order No. 134.

## Adjournment

Adjourned till Tuesday 23 June at 2.00pm

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# Witnesses

The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the [inquiry publications page](#) of the Committee's website.

## Tuesday 13 January 2026

**Alastair Gunn**, Trade Policy Lead at Road Haulage Association;  
**Julian Walker**, Chief Commercial Officer and Regional Director at Associated British Ports; **Toby Ovens**, Managing Director at Broughton Transport [Q157-195](#)

**Tom Bradshaw**, President at National Farmers' Union;  
**Matt Hinde**, Head of International Policy and Engagement at National Grid; **Peter Brennan**, Director of Trade and Economic Policy at UK Steel; **Oriel Petry**, Senior Vice President at Airbus UK [Q196-233](#)

**Sean McGuire**, Director - Europe and International at Confederation of British Industry (CBI); **Paul Nowak**, General Secretary at Trades Union Congress (TUC) [Q234-251](#)

## Monday 9 March 2026

**Chris Bryant MP**, Minister for Trade at Department for Business and Trade;  
**Kate Joseph**, Director General, Economic Security and Trade Relations at Department for Business and Trade; **Amanda Brooks CBE**, Director General, Trade Policy, Implementation and Negotiations at Department for Business and Trade [Q345-440](#)

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# Published written evidence

The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the [inquiry publications page](#) of the Committee's website.

EUT numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and so may not be complete.

1	ABTA	<a href="#">EUT0017</a>
2	ADS Group	<a href="#">EUT0042</a>
3	Airlines UK	<a href="#">EUT0026</a>
4	Alternative Proteins Association	<a href="#">EUT0029</a>
5	Animal Equality UK	<a href="#">EUT0003</a>
6	AstraZeneca	<a href="#">EUT0012</a>
7	Bar Council of England and Wales	<a href="#">EUT0059</a>
8	British Chambers of Commerce	<a href="#">EUT0047</a>
9	British Poultry Council	<a href="#">EUT0033</a>
10	British Standards Institution	<a href="#">EUT0041</a>
11	Butler, Dr Nicolette (Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Manchester); and Tarawneh, Dr Jasem (Reader in Law, Queen Mary University of London)	<a href="#">EUT0011</a>
12	Buziuk, Hleb	<a href="#">EUT0004</a>
13	Buziuk, Hleb	<a href="#">EUT0005</a>
14	Centre of European Law, King's College London	<a href="#">EUT0058</a>
15	City of London Corporation	<a href="#">EUT0057</a>
16	Compassion in World Farming	<a href="#">EUT0008</a>
17	Competere Foundation	<a href="#">EUT0044</a>
18	CropLife UK	<a href="#">EUT0037</a>
19	Elliott, Robert (Professor of Economics, University of Birmingham); and Han, Yangjun (Research Fellow, University of Birmingham); Wanyu Chung (Associate Professor of Economics, University of Birmingham)	<a href="#">EUT0016</a>
20	European Movement in Scotland	<a href="#">EUT0025</a>

21	Food and Drink Federation	<a href="#">EUT0028</a>
22	Getlink Group	<a href="#">EUT0040</a>
23	Heron, Anthony	<a href="#">EUT0007</a>
24	Johnson Matthey PLC	<a href="#">EUT0013</a>
25	LIVE	<a href="#">EUT0010</a>
26	Law Society of Scotland	<a href="#">EUT0020</a>
27	Lloyd's Market Association	<a href="#">EUT0015</a>
28	Make UK	<a href="#">EUT0050</a>
29	NCC Group	<a href="#">EUT0043</a>
30	National Farmer's Union (NFU)	<a href="#">EUT0022</a>
31	Nissan Motor Manufacturing UK Ltd.	<a href="#">EUT0034</a>
32	Port of Dover	<a href="#">EUT0039</a>
33	Probert, Ms Sue	<a href="#">EUT0018</a>
34	Quality Meat Scotland	<a href="#">EUT0014</a>
35	RSPCA	<a href="#">EUT0006</a>
36	Rahman, Mr MD Mahfuzur	<a href="#">EUT0002</a>
37	Road Haulage Association	<a href="#">EUT0045</a>
38	Scotch Whisky Association	<a href="#">EUT0035</a>
39	Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders (SMMT)	<a href="#">EUT0053</a>
40	Soo, Dr Kwok Tong	<a href="#">EUT0031</a>
41	Tees Valley Lithium	<a href="#">EUT0019</a>
42	The Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA)	<a href="#">EUT0051</a>
43	The Law Society	<a href="#">EUT0021</a>
44	The Society of Lloyd's	<a href="#">EUT0032</a>
45	TheCityUK	<a href="#">EUT0055</a>
46	Trade and Animal Welfare Coalition	<a href="#">EUT0036</a>
47	UK Finance	<a href="#">EUT0024</a>
48	UK Government	<a href="#">EUT0052</a>
49	UK Trade Policy Observatory - University of Sussex	<a href="#">EUT0056</a>
50	UK in a Changing Europe	<a href="#">EUT0023</a>
51	UKinbound	<a href="#">EUT0046</a>
52	Vinted	<a href="#">EUT0030</a>

53	Walpole	<a href="#"><u>EUT0038</u></a>
54	Wine and Spirit Trade Association	<a href="#"><u>EUT0027</u></a>
55	Wonderfield Group	<a href="#"><u>EUT0009</u></a>
56	techUK	<a href="#"><u>EUT0054</u></a>

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# List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament

All publications from the Committee are available on the [publications page](#) of the Committee's website.

## Session 2026–27

Number	Title	Reference
5th	Post Office Horizon scandal: justice for sub-postmasters: Government Response	HC 129
3rd	Competition and market functioning in the UK live music industry	HC 128
2nd	The regulation of postal services	HC 131
1st	Investing in the UK economy	HC 123

## Session 2024–26

Number	Title	Reference
17th	Pre-appointment hearing with the Government's preferred candidate for the Chair of the Competition and Markets Authority	HC 1723
16th	Post Office Horizon scandal: Justice for sub-postmasters	HC 1589
15th	Small business strategy	HC 1057
14th	Toward a new doctrine for economic security: Government Response	HC 1666
13th	Priorities of the Business and Trade Committee for 2026	HC 1411
12th	UK-India Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA)	HC 996
11th	Toward a new doctrine for economic security	HC 835
10th	US Economic Prosperity Deal	HC 1306

Number	Title	Reference
9th	Draft Legislative Reform (Disclosure of Adult Social Care Data) Order 2025	HC 1140
8th	Export led growth: Trade with the Asia-Pacific region	HC 1048
7th	Industrial Strategy	HC 727
6th	How to strengthen UK-EU relations: Policy Priorities for the Summit	HC 908
5th	How to strengthen UK-EU relations	HC – 814
4th	Post Office Horizon scandal redress: Unfinished business: Government response	HC 778
3rd	Make Work Pay: Employment Rights Bill	HC 370
2nd	Priorities of the Business and Trade Committee	HC 423
1st	Post Office and Horizon scandal redress: Unfinished business	HC 341
7th Special	UK-India Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA): Government Response	HC 1832
6th Special	US Economic Prosperity Deal: Government Response	HC 1545
5th Special	Export led growth: Trade with the Asia-Pacific Region: Government Response	HC 1324
4th Special	Industrial Strategy: Government Response	HC 1305
3rd Special	How to strengthen UK-EU relations: Policy Priorities for the Summit: Government Response	HC 1267
2nd Special	Post Office Horizon scandal redress: Unfinished business: Government response	HC 969
1st Special	Make Work Pay: Employment Rights Bill: Government response	HC 932